Green Gold? An Analysis of Saudi Renewable Energy Policy from 1960 to 2010 by Bailey, Jacob
 i 
ABSTRACT 
 
Title of Thesis: Green Gold? An Analysis of Saudi Renewable Energy 
Policy from 1960 to 2010     
 
Jacob D. Bailey, B.A. International Studies; B.A. 
Psychology, 2018 
 
Thesis Directed by:    Doctor Melanie Tanielian 
     
 
 This work explored the question, “How did the Saudi government’s desire for political 
stability, a cultural reliance on oil within Saudi society, and the ineptitude of state-sponsored 
environmental authorities influence the development of renewable energy practices in Saudi 
Arabia from 1960-2010?” Using primary and secondary sources from both Saudi Arabia and the 
international community, this thesis posits that, although there was a strong renewable research 
and development presence existent in Saudi Arabia since the 1960s, movement toward practical 
implementation stalled from then until 2010. This stagnation at the implementation stage can be 
attributed to a dominating narrative of oil reliance within Saudi culture, the Saudi government’s 
desire to maintain political stability, and the ineptitude of state-sponsored environmental 
organizations. While previous literature exists on each of these three factors as a primary 
facilitator for the perpetuation of fossil fuels, this thesis proposes that understanding their 
intersectionality serves as a better method for analyzing the continued failure of the 
implementation of renewable policy. 
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Chapter I: Essential History and Existing Opinions 
“We are living in a different world now. You can see it everywhere in international 
relations: It was noteworthy that, after his visit to Washington, the Chinese president’s next stop 
was to Saudi Arabia” 
--Daniel Yergin1 
The Question, Motivation, and Contributions to Research 
 This work explores how the Saudi government’s desire for political stability, the long-
standing economic reliance on oil, and the inefficiency of state-sponsored environmental 
authorities undermined the development of sustainable energy in Saudi Arabia from 1960 to 
2010. This thesis examines the history of Saudi Arabia’s failed sustainable energy policies taking 
into account the interplay of culture, religion and politics in preventing the development of a 
coherent and successful move away from oil dependency. Herein, it considers the dominating oil 
reliance narrative, the desire for stability from the federal government, and the inefficiency of 
state-sponsored environmental authorities as key determinants of the socio-cultural climate of 
Saudi Arabia. It will become clear that these three key areas contributed uniquely and variably 
over time toward a continued prioritization of oil over renewables in Saudi Arabia’s domestic 
energy production. While this has perpetuated a successful carbon-based energy production in 
the past, the focus on an oil economy clearly, as elsewhere, here too is untenable for the long-
term future. Assuming the Saudis understand this, I outline how desire for political stability, a 
comfort with an existent oil economy, and the lack of political will to change, has influenced the 
path of renewable development, and how interactions between these key factors helped, or 
                                                 
1 Jung, A., & Mascolo, G. (2006). “Energy Security Will Be One of the Main Challenges of Foreign Policy.” 
[Interview]. In Der Spiegel. Retrieved from: http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/the-war-over-resources-
energy-security-will-be-one-of-the-main-challenges-of-foreign-policy-a-427350.html 
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hindered, the practical implementation of renewable energy on a regional or national scale. This 
thesis argues that, in response to global pressure for more environmentally-friendly energy 
production methods, a strong movement for the research and development of renewable energy 
existed along the narrative of Saudi leadership on the world stage, but that there was little 
progress, however, toward practical implementation within Saudi Arabia. This is due to a 
dominating cultural narrative of oil reliance from both the government and its people, the Saudi 
government’s desire for stability, and the inefficiency of state-sponsored environmental 
authorities. While these factors have been considered individually by previous literature, it is 
important to consider these factors together as it is, I argue, their relationship that perpetuated the 
continued use of fossil fuels and stalled large-scale adoption of a renewable energy infrastructure 
from 1960-2010. 
Historical Overview 
The history of Saudi Arabia as an independent state begins in 1927, when the United 
Kingdom abdicated its rule and recognized the sovereignty of the Kingdoms of the Hijaz and 
Nejd, with King Ibn Saud as their ruler2. Following years of dual-rule between competing 
kingdoms in the area, Ibn Saud consolidated his power by founding the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia in 1932. Supported by the Wahhabi sect of Islam, which had centuries-old ties with the 
House of Saud and strong support in both the Hejaz and Nejd, King Ibn Saud brought the region 
under a centralized regime for the first time in its 20,000-year history3. In unifying Saudi Arabia, 
King Ibn Saud maintained the existing law in each of the thirteen tribal sub-regions, while 
                                                 
2 United Kingdom-House of Saud. (1927). “Treaty Between His Majesty and His Majesty the King of the Hijaz and 
of Nejd and its Dependencies.”  
 
3 Vassiliev, Alexei. (1998). The History of Saudi Arabia. London, UK: Al Saqi Books. ISBN 0-86356-935-8. 
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building a loose, yet centralized federal government structure to oversee his kingdom. Although 
these regions were geographically and culturally distinct, the destruction of tribal borders 
through unification encouraged interaction among groups. What followed was a “slow, 
irreversible” change as Ibn Saud decided to move the Saudi capital to Riyadh. This move 
required new buildings for the capital itself and the city4. Buildings were constructed according 
to the latest in urban design, with more advanced and durable building techniques5. This 
advanced construction is evidenced by the prominence of modern villas throughout major cities, 
built mainly from cement instead of traditional wood6. In addition, the Sauds introduced of new 
transportation methods like cars and modernized urban planning methods to Saudi society7. 
More generally, a transition toward industrialization started slowly and took off later in the 
1960s with major international investments in petrochemicals (oil and natural gas)8. The Saudi 
state sponsored this rapid development in urban regions via the rentier state system, in which 
states charge mining and export taxes on their natural resources, thus defeating the need for a 
productive domestic sector9. This transition, which occurred quickly in comparison to other 
developing states, added pressure to modernize to a traditionally-conservative Saudi society10.  
                                                 
4 Eben Saleh, 1998.  
5 Lombre, Traci (2006). “Saudi Arabia: Looking Beyond the Veil.” In University of Chicago Center for Middle 
Eastern Studies Newsletter, Volume 2, No. 1. Chicago: University of Chicago.  
6
Eben Saleh, 1998. 
7 Eben Saleh, Mohammad Abdullah. (1998). “Life and Death of Traditional Settlements of Southwest Saudi 
Arabia.” Journal of Architectural Education (1984). 51(3). pp. 177-191.  
8 Beaumont, P. et. al. (2016) The Middle East: A Geographical Study, 2nd Ed. London: Routledge. ISBN: 
9781317240297 
9 Mahdavy, H. (1970). "The Pattern and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: The Case of Iran.” 
In Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East. ed. M.A. Cook. Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
10 Barth, H.K, & Quiel, F. (1986). “Development and Changes in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia.” Published 
in GeoJournal, 13:3 pp. 251-259. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing.  
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Shortly after the creation of the Saudi state in 1930, Ibn Saud partnered with the 
American Standard Oil Company of New York (SOCONY) in drilling for petroleum. The first 
oil discovery was made in 1938, and Ibn Saud granted the Americans drilling rights in 194411. 
With this new resource came new needs in the young country: to operate the drilling sites in and 
around Dhammam, roads and cities needed to be built, materials had to be imported to build a 
port near the well, and unskilled laborers had to be trained quickly. According to the Country 
Studies, published by the Library of Congress in 2018, SOCONY (which transitioned to the 
name Arab-American Oil Company - Aramco) used this opportunity to improve the lives of 
Saudis. They trained unskilled domestic laborers to fill required jobs around a drill site, and 
funded scholarships for “doctors, supply experts, machinists, ship pilots, truck drivers, oil 
drillers, and cooks.”12 As a result, many Saudi nationals worked independently upon leaving 
Aramco, and improved their own standard of living through starting their own businesses13. In 
the same manner, Aramco partnered with the Saudi government to build railways and paved 
roads. Thus, cities like Jeddah and Riyadh developed into modern cultural and social centers by 
the 1960s14. 
The settlement of nomadic communities in increasingly modernized cities brought about 
debates and questions about the future of Saudi society. During the 1950s, regional leaders, most 
notably Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt, spread ideas of secular nationalism was prevalent in the 
Middle East. The founder of the United Arab Republic (1958) and member of the Arab League 
                                                 
11 Library of Congress. (2017). “Islamism in Saudi Arabia”. In The Library of Congress Country Study on Saudi 
Arabia.  
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Nehme, M. (1994). “Saudi Development Plans Between Capitalist and Islamic Values.” In Middle Eastern 
Studies, 30:3. pp. 632-645. doi: 10.1080/00263209408701015 
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(1945-present), Nasser gained popularity by resisting European colonial forces, most 
prominently through nationalizing the Suez Canal.  Nasser saw religious leadership as an 
obstacle to introducing his ideology of Arab socialism and successfully sidelined the Egyptian 
ulama, becoming one of the first Middle Eastern heads 15. In Saudi Arabia, tribes maintained 
their existing way of life, despite more interaction and integration under the unified state.  
Wahhabi clerics, following a conservative interpretation of Islam, in particular pushed 
back against Westernization and the import of foreign ideas and goods. Wahhabi Islam had 
become the official state religion not only because of its long connection with the House of Saud, 
but also because of its supportive role of the ulama in the creation of the modern state16. Indeed, 
the Wahhabi ulama, or religious scholars, took control of education, law, and religious custom 
during the 1900s, while permitting Ibn Saud to deal with non-Muslims and import modern 
technology as a “trade-off”17. In this way, the ulama influenced Saudi policy at the federal level, 
and used oil money from the Royal family to advance their conservative agenda and reach 
beyond the political borders of Saudi Arabia to take hold in other countries in the Gulf18. 
When it came to international relations, Ibn Saud had historically maintained contact with 
American President Franklin D. Roosevelt and supplied the Allies with oil during World War II. 
Ibn Saud hoped that it would convince the Americans to side with him when it came to the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict19. While Saudi Arabia remained neutral during the Second World 
                                                 
15 Cook, Steven. (2011). The Struggle for Egypt: From Nasser to Tahrir Square. London: Oxford University Press. 
ISBN 978-0199795260 
 
16  Kepel, Gilles, & Roberts, Anthony, trans. (2002). “Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam”. Harvard University Press. 
17 Commins, David (2009). “The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia”. London, England: I.B. Tauris. 
18 Vogel, F. (2000) “Islamic Law and the Legal System of Saudi: Studies of Saudi Arabia.” In Studies in Islamic 
Law and Society Series, 8:1. ISBN: 9789004110625 
 
19 Assi, Seraj. (2017). “When Franklin D. Roosevelt met Ibn Saud.” In Al-Araby.  
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War, it was not given a choice in the Cold War: both the Soviets and the United States had a 
vested interest in the Middle East. The Soviets saw the Middle East as a strategic gateway from 
which they could spread Communism into Asia and Africa. The United States, in turn, wanted to 
protect its oil interests in the Gulf Region. These two powers, however, could not address each 
other through direct military force: the threat of nuclear war was too real during the 1950s. 
Instead, they chose to fight via proxy groups in various theaters across the globe, the Middle East 
being one.   
When King Ibn Saud died in 1953, the Saudi throne remained open for the first time in 
history. He was succeeded by his son, Saud, who defeated his brother Faisal for the throne in 
195320. Within the first year of his reign, Saud expanded the government by creating the Council 
of Ministers. The council was comprised of other members of the House of Saud and close 
aristocratic friends, Saud clearly recognized the need for a larger government in the growing 
country. Over the next decade ministries would be established for communication (1953), 
agriculture and water (1953), education (1953), petroleum and mineral resources (1960), 
pilgrimage and Islamic endowments (1960), labor and social affairs (1962), and information 
(1963). 
The expansion of the federal government was in part a response to the rising expectations 
from its citizens. In 1953 and again in 1956, domestic laborers from Saudi Aramco began 
demonstrations in response to worker conditions and their inability to unionize21. Saud 
responded to these protests with force, which undermined his popularity among the Saudi public. 
Although his responses to these strikes were dictatorial, the remainder of his reign was marked 
                                                 
20 Al-Rasheed, Madawi. (2010). “A History of Saudi Arabia, 2nd Edition.” London: Cambridge University Press. 
 
21 Ibid.  
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by modernization and urban reform. Similarly, Saudi Aramco began to build rapport with the 
public. In 1959, Aramco sent its first cohort of Saudi students to study in America22 The early 
years of the Saudi state were occupied with state-building and socioeconomic development. 
Sustainable energy in Saudi Arabia, as most elsewhere in the world, was not a priority, nor was it 
seen as a necessary policy development considering the vast oil resources.  It was only in the 
1960s when the Saudi government addressed renewables as a country, and began their slow, but 
steady exploration into alternative energy. This slow expansion has to be seen in the light of the 
local, regional and international power dynamics that had already manifested in this early time 
period. 
Literature Review 
The goal of this work is to demonstrate that a strong commitment to the research and 
development of renewable energy existed among Saudi leaders, at least when it came to rhetoric 
in the international arena. This came in response to global pressure for more environmentally-
friendly energy production methods. Still, despite a pro-renewable rhetoric in the international 
public sphere, there was little movement toward practical implementation within Saudi Arabia 
due to a culture of oil reliance promoted by the government and supported by the people. In 
addition, the House of Saud’s desire for political stability and the inefficiency of standing state-
sponsored environmental authorities undermined any significant concrete advancement toward a 
shift in energy policy. Scholars have looked at these factors in isolation, but I argue that their 
intersectionality perpetuated the continued use of fossil fuels for energy production in Saudi 
Arabia. As a result, large-scale implementation of a renewable energy infrastructure from 1960-
                                                 
22 Saudi Aramco. (2018). “1950s”.  
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2010 was stalled23. It does not, however, consider the interaction of each of the three factors in 
strengthening the argument against the implementation of large-scale renewable projects in the 
country. Often, authors will consider one factor, such as culture, a lack of education, or financial 
burden as the sole or primary facilitator in perpetuating anti-renewable sentiment in Saudi 
Arabia. These monocausal explanations, although true to a degree, do not acknowledge that there 
is no primary facilitator at fault for the failure to implement a large-scale renewable energy 
infrastructure in the country. These factors and their multidirectional relationships, in turn, affect 
the prospects of a renewable energy infrastructure in Saudi Arabia. The explanation for this 
failure sits at the intersection of these three major factors, which have, with varying degrees of 
intentionality, influenced fifty years of popular opinion and policy making in the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia.  
The objectives of this thesis are achieved through the examination of primary and 
secondary sources. These sources include national news reports, policies and documents from 
national and international authorities, dissertations, and historical reviews. These sources present 
their own biases, but their commonalities separate fact from opinion. For example, similarities 
between C.I.A. reports and Saudi Aramco articles in the 1980s can confirm policy actions during 
a tumultuous time in oil economics. To confirm these measures, Barth and Quiel’s 
“Development and Changes in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia” provides an independent 
investigation of economic and social development in one region of Saudi Arabia. The integration 
of Saudi, American, and third-party primary and secondary sources provides a comprehensive 
scope with which to examine the success and failure of the Saudi National Development Plans, 
                                                 
23 Al-Gilani, Ahmad Ali. (1998). “The Environment: Theories, Assessment Techniques, and Policies: The Saudi 
Experience.” Ph. D. dissertation, The University of Edinburgh. 
 
 9 
and thus confirm the importance of the intersectionality of culture, economy, and politics in the 
stagnation of renewable energy development at the research and development stage.  
The years 1960 and 2010 were chosen as chronological parameters for this work because 
1960 marked the first time that renewable energy was seriously considered by the state in Saudi 
Arabia, while 2010 serves as the end of the Eighth National Development Plan in Saudi Arabia. 
This is the last plan whose effects on the economy have been noticed and covered by scholarly 
sources. Since these plans last every five years, they are used as benchmarks by which to 
evaluate the Saudi government’s progress socially and economically. Additionally, these reports 
provide a blueprint for the development of the Saudi energy profile. From these documents, 
intentions regarding Saudi use of oil in domestic energy production and international trade. 
The Dominating Narrative of Oil Reliance 
The historian Ahmad Al-Gilani argues that a predominant cultural narrative of oil 
reliance led Saudi policymakers to facilitate the domestic use of their greatest export for energy 
production. The outcome was limited education and a continued reliance upon tradition as a 
means of survival. In making his point, Al-Gilani details the deterioration of the cultural concept 
hema, which outlines traditional practice for land and wildlife conservation24. He claims that the 
Saudi Government employed aggressive spending strategies to push modernization, thus 
continuing dependence on oil25. While scholarly literature has not ignored the lack of formal 
education regarding conservation or anthropogenic climate change, we find a discussion about 
the environment in a perhaps surprising source. It may seem paradoxical, but Saudi Aramco 
began educating the public on environmental stewardship as early as 1959 through scholarships 
                                                 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
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to American universities, the dissemination of various media to the public, and involving the 
local communities in their climate change reduction strategies 26. The reach of Aramco 
publications, however, was limited. Although they may have been intended for the larger Saudi 
public, Aramco publications were often disseminated in English and aimed at individuals already 
educated in environmental engineering and energy policy. The idea of a Saudi cultural 
connection to the oil has not been directly addressed by previous literature to my knowledge. 
Omolade Adunbi’s principles for understanding the cultural connection to oil in Nigeria, 
however, provides parallels to the situation in Saudi Arabia. He posits that Nigerians see oil as an 
asset endowed to them by God27. They use this narrative in justifying heavy government 
involvement in oil production in the country, which is then, in theory, supposed to benefit the 
people28. Similarly, the intimate Saudi connection to Islam and cultural traditionalism served to 
rationalize the government’s buyout of Aramco in the 1980s as a means of seizing total control 
over their God-given wealth from foreign powers29. 
Politics of Stability 
Another consistent theme in the history of energy in Saudi Arabia is the monarchy’s 
prioritization of its own security over the health of its people. This prioritization is evidenced by 
the continued disregard for negative health effects resulting from fossil fuel-based energy 
production. Generally, air and water pollution has been known to lead to higher rates of asthma, 
ingestion of hazardous pollutants, and various cancers, among other diseases.  
                                                 
26 Saudi Aramco. (2018). “1950s”.  
27 Adunbi, Omolade. (2015). Oil Wealth and Insurgency in Nigeria. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
28 Ibid.  
29 Ayubi, Nazih. (1995). Over-Stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East. New York: I.B. 
Tauris. 
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Historian Tracy Lombre’s 2006 account of Saudi life details a growing urban 
population30. In addition to the reported absence of poverty and unprecedented rate of 
modernization, it makes sense that the Saudi government would continue to use oil domestically. 
In addition, continued utilization of existing oil-based energy infrastructure is more cost-efficient 
than retrofitting the national power grid renewables.  
The only potential pressure to shift toward a renewable energy infrastructure in Saudi 
Arabia from 1960 to 2010 would have been Saudi Aramco. Even when the United States 
controlled the company, the power dynamic between Aramco and the Saudi government was 
well-understood by both parties. The Saudi government knew that the United States needed the 
oil and presence in the Middle East, and the United States was willing to do whatever it could to 
maintain their strategic partnership in oil and foreign policy. The United States’ priorities were 
geo-strategic relations and the political economy of oil; the environment and a long duree 
sustainable energy policy were simply unimportant. This understanding is confirmed in Historian 
Chad H. Parker’s work, which shows that, as late as 1977, Aramco defended Saudi concerns 
about Israel as a means of continuing good US-Saudi relations31. Further, Al-Gilani’s dissertation 
claims that an unspoken agreement existed between Aramco and the Saudi government, in which 
Aramco would not publicly discuss the government’s lackluster environmental protection 
regulations, while the government would not actively oversee Aramco’s actions32. Coupled with 
the lack of public education regarding national environmental issues, this agreement allowed the 
                                                 
30 Lombre, 2006. 
 
31 Parker, C. (2008). “Transports of progress: the Arabian American Oil Company and American modernization in 
Saudi Arabia, 1945--1973.” Ph. D. Dissertation, Indiana University. 
 
32 Al-Gilani, 1998. 
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Saudi government to use oil as they pleased with no domestic pressure to demand environmental 
regulations.  
During the early 1990s, the Persian Gulf War caused a unique shift in the global oil 
economy. Saudi Arabia now turned to the West, using oil as a bargaining chip for military 
equipment. The Saudi government, fearing revolutionary secular nationalism, saw a concrete 
need to bolster their defenses on the East coast in response to the growth of Saddam’s movement 
33. Using it oil resources, the Saudi government was able to strengthen its military and deter any 
foreign invasion, maintaining a certain stability through the use of oil, both domestically and 
internationally. 
While international oil trade allowed the Saudi government to protect the country, 
domestic oil usage powered the country’s expansion and urban growth. Ministerial Advisor for 
Marketing and Cooperatives Saad bin Abdulaziz Al-Ajlan’s assessment of Saudi energy projects 
showed that renewables have only been implemented and successful on a local scale in rural 
areas 34. This limitation is due to fossil fuel being the most readily-available and most-heavily 
subsidized fuel source domestically. More generally, decision-making patterns indicate a Saudi 
focus on the short to mid-term in investment until 2010. For example, decisions are made while 
only taking into consideration the next 30 years. The Saudi government and Meteorological and 
Environmental Protection Agency (MEPA) ignored negative health effects in the public 
associated with the existing energy infrastructure, in which carbon-based production facilities are 
often located near cities. Although 30 years is a small scope within which to consider nationwide 
                                                 
33 Little, D. (2008). American orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945. Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press.  
 
34 Al-Ajlan, S.A., Al-Ibrahim, M.A., Abdulkhaleq, M., & Alghamdi, F. (2006). Developing Sustainable Energy 
Policies for Electrical Energy Conservation in Saudi Arabia.  
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energy infrastructure development, it allowed Saudi Arabia to justify the continuation of 
domestic electricity production from fossil fuels.  
So far, scholars have paid particular attention to the development of electricity production 
and its relation to development. Concurrent with Al-Ajlan, Saudi electrical engineer and 
Professor Othman Al-Natheer noted that five energy grids existed in Saudi Arabia, but only two 
are connected35. Regional disconnection increased statewide dependence on large-scale power 
development. Still in the testing phase, energy production on this scale was much too large of a 
demand for renewables. Before 2010, powering one-fifth of Saudi Arabia via renewables was 
ambitious, but doable. Despite that, the Saudi government decided it was in their best interest to 
continue to spend on maintaining and expanding the current energy infrastructure to appease 
their subjects and secure their place on the throne. 
This thesis will use a broader scope than Al-Ajlan and Al-Natheer by examining various 
Saudi national development plans. While these authors’ works set an invaluable foundation for 
understanding existing Saudi infrastructure, readers will gain a more comprehensive 
understanding of Saudi energy practices by understanding the goals that the government was 
trying to reach at the time. Therefore, I plan to use national development plans as a context for 
explaining how environmentalism and oil reliance influenced Saudi domestic policy, thus paving 
the way for research, but not development, of alternative energy solutions.  
 
 
                                                 
35Al-Natheer, Othman (2005). The Potential Contribution of Renewable Energy to Electricity Supply in Saudi 
Arabia. Retrieved from: http://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2003.12.013.  
  
 14 
Ineptitude of State-Sponsored Environmental Authorities 
The environmental organizations associated with the government in Saudi Arabia have 
not sufficiently regulated energy production and maintenance in a sustainable manner. This 
malpractice allowed the state to exploit Saudi land without consideration for the long-term 
impacts of their decisions. In turn, the responsibility for environmental stewardship fell to Saudi 
Aramco, who had “sound conservation methods” in place since the early 1960s36. Indeed, their 
practices backed up their reporting: Aramco consistently superceded the Saudi government in 
their environmental protection plans and strategies. In addition to environmentally responsible 
oil extraction practices, these programs covered areas like wildlife and water conservation, green 
energy production, and renewable-based transportation37. Thus, the importance of long-term 
planning was downplayed by the federal government and the renewable option was further 
delayed. As Al-Gilani notes, the most significant point-source polluters were government-run 
facilities, namely smelters, desalination plants, and petro-chemical facilities38. Furthermore, 
energy officials created easily-met sustainability goals in an effort to secure their position in 
power. As a result, Saudi Aramco created its own environmental standards in the 1960s, which 
exceeded those set by the government. Meanwhile, oil discharge and sewage from domestic 
extraction companies was deregulated through the 1990s, which made much of the land and 
potable water in urban areas unusable. In addition, lackluster implementation of anti-lead gas 
laws led to continuing pollution eleven years after the fact (laws were passed in 1984, lead gas 
was eliminated in 1995). This new law led to a 50% reduction in carbon monoxide and lead 
                                                 
36 n.a. (1962). “A Matter of Foresight.” In Aramco World. 13:4. Dhahran, Aramco Services Company. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Al-Gilani, 1998. 
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emissions39. In an earlier work, Al-Gilani and Filor detailed the formation of the MEPA. This 
agency produced State of the Environment Reports every five years after their inception in the 
1980s. The reports, according to Al-Gilani and Filor, contained “no useful information” on the 
implementation of environmental protection policies in the country40. For example, one edition 
of this report included only pictures of Saudi landscapes. Generally speaking, Al-Gilani and 
landscape architect Seamus Filor claim that environmental impact is only included in national 
policy to the extent of admitting there is an impact41. This lack of planning is further evidence of 
the shortsightedness of the Saudi plan for development of the state energy infrastructure. The 
only progress made in environmental policy since 1990 is the passing of Agenda 21, a 
comprehensive management and development strategy for parks and wildlife. Even while Saudi 
Arabia turned to other countries for assistance in developing Agenda 21, there was no progress 
toward practical implementation. Although this trend of stalling projects which protect the 
environment is indicative of a larger hesitance against anti-renewable measures within the 
country, there has been little previously written regarding their relationship. Authors such as 
Gilles Kepel and Michael Schmid mention these failures in achieving stated policy goals, but do 
not make the connection between their failures and the stalled renewable projects, which 
exceeded 100 by 200342. In the following work, I examine the development of this trend from its 
origin (presumably in the 1960s) via correlations between energy policy promises and their 
implementation. In this way, the separation between those two can be tracked, and the trend over 
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50 years used to forecast the path of the dissonance between the government’s promises and 
actions. This analysis offers insights regarding the consistency with which the Saudi federal 
government maintained and fulfilled its promises concerning environmental conservation, both 
at the domestic and international level.   
Outline of the Thesis 
 The thesis proceeds chronologically, with chapter two examining the years 1960-1985. 
These twenty-five years mark the beginning of renewable exploration in Saudi Arabia. Ending 
just before oil price collapse of 1985, I analyze Saudi Arabia’s increased use of the “oil weapon”, 
particularly in place of defense spending. At the same time, I explore the revolution of rising 
domestic expectations among the Saudi public, which responded to newfound government 
surpluses from oil revenue as a result of an improvement in the standard of living for many. 
Finally, I explain how the purchase of Saudi Aramco by the Saudi government led to the 
development of Saudi Arabia’s first federal environmental authorities. This chapter integrates a 
cultural narrative of oil reliance, the government’s desire to maintain stability, and the ineptitude 
of state-sponsored environmental authorities to explain the centrality of oil to all aspects of Saudi 
life. 
 Chapter three covers 1985-2001. During this period, Saudi Arabia was forced to address 
important regional conflicts such as the Kuwait War (1990-1991). The chapter pays particular 
attention to Saudi Arabia’s evolving relationship with the West, mainly the United States. Here, I 
demonstrate the negative social effects of Operations Desert Storm and Shield had on the House 
of Saud’s power position in the country. Furthermore, the chapter explores the growing 
independence of the neo-Wahhabi movement, and the role this movement played in promoting 
traditionalism domestically. This chapter ends by outlining the new, Western plans for state 
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environmental policy. The main argument of this chapter is that Saudi Arabia continued to grow 
as a global power but faced new challenges at home that forced their continued dependence on 
oil. 
 Chapter four evaluates Saudi energy policies from 2001, after the al-Qaida attacks of the 
United States on September 11, to the end of the Eighth National Development Plan in 2010. I 
chose to finish this work in 2010 because the Eighth Plan is old enough that its policies can be 
evaluated for effectiveness. This chapter details the Seventh and Eighth Development Plans and 
works to understand their goals in the context of energy production. At the same time, the Saudi 
response to heightened international interest in climate change is addressed. To conclude, I 
examine Saudi Arabia’s commitment to the Kyoto Protocol (1997), and its newfound interest in 
the science and technology industry. This chapter contends that the Saudi response to the 
international push for sustainable energy was to openly oppose, but privately join the fight 
against climate change. The reason for this decision is twofold: first, the Saudis wanted to 
diversify their economy after being shaken by unforeseen oil fluctuations in the early 2000s. 
Second, they wanted to expand industry to allow more Saudi nationals to work, particularly those 
who were college-educated. 
 To finish, chapter five concludes with an evaluation of the progress that Saudi Arabia 
made from 2010 to the present day. I consider the changing tone of the Saudi response to more 
recent international environmental initiatives, shifts in resource planning to account for the 
longer-term, and the continued aim of diversification of the Saudi economic profile. Here I 
demonstrate that, since the Eighth Plan, modest improvements were made toward diversification, 
but the country is still largely reliant on the energy sector for income. Because there has not been 
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a cheaper or more efficient fuel produced, oil continues to be the main economic driver in Saudi 
Arabia.  
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Chapter II: A Conceptual Transition - 1960-1985 
“To those peoples in the huts and villages of half the globe struggling to break the bonds 
of mass misery, we pledge our best efforts to help them help themselves, for whatever period is 
required - not because the Communists may be doing it, not because we seek their votes, but 
because it is right. If a free society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few 
who are rich.”  
  -- John F. Kennedy, January 196143 
 
Introduction 
 The discovery and increased access to oil spurred rapid industrialization around the world 
throughout the twentieth century. For most oil consuming states, industrialization brought about 
an increased standard of living, modernization, and even political independence. Yet the boom in 
oil consumption had an even greater effect on oil-producing states. Saudi Arabia, in particular, 
made great economic gains. Previously a tribal country whose primary national income was 
derived from a religious tax, Saudi Arabia developed quickly after drilling began in Dhammam 
in 19354445. The financial benefit from the discovery of oil propelled Saudi Arabia, which held 
the most oil reserves and fourth-most natural gas reserves, onto the global stage as a serious 
energy trading force 46. 
 At the same time, policymakers in developing states became interested in environmental 
changes. As early as 1938, American scientists asserted that rising temperatures were tied to the 
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increased emission of carbon dioxide. Although largely discredited at first, consequent studies 
affirming this discovery led to the declaration by the U.S. President’s Advisory Committee, 
which claimed that the greenhouse effect was a matter of “real concern” in 196547. In response, 
much of the developed world began exploring renewable energy to alleviate the adverse effects 
of carbon emissions on the environment. Ironically, Saudi Arabia was at the forefront of 
experimentation with renewable energy. The primary interest, however, was not preserving the 
environment. Rather, the Saudi government was focused on perpetuating political and social 
stability in an increasingly volatile global context that showed signs of diverting from oil. This 
chapter explores Saudi Arabia’s failure to address long-term environmental damage done by its 
fossil fuel-based energy infrastructure from 1960-1985. Further, this chapter explores how that 
failure was perpetuated by the Saudi government’s use of their “oil weapon” to finance defense 
spending as well as the revolution of rising domestic expectations based on national oil profits. 
Finally, this chapter discusses the Saudi government’s purchase of the majority stake in Saudi 
Aramco in 1974, in terms of its influence on state-sponsored environmental authorities. 
Ineptitude of State-Sponsored Environmental Authorities 
In 1964, as a response to his inability to urbanize effectively, the House of Saud replaced King 
Saud with King Faisal bin Hussein bin Ali Al-Hashemi48. According to Professor Andrew C. 
Hess, Faisal was asked to “meet the challenges of the oil era without compromising the 
principles of the Saudi state”49. This meant affirming the centralized leadership of the House of 
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Saud and its religious counterpart, Wahhabi Islam50. In response, Faisal engaged in expeditious 
infrastructural change, while maintaining social and cultural conservativism51. Specifically, he 
loosened restrictions on oil production, expanded the central government, encouraged 
conservative interpretations of Islamic practice, subsidized social services, and halted the growth 
of unions52.  King Faisal’s reforms brought his country to the forefront of global technological 
research and innovation. At the same time, his reforms failed to address the budding field of 
climate science, which may have inspired a more conscious effort to deal with the negative 
effects of carbon emissions. State-sponsored environmental regulations were virtually 
nonexistent in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia until the 1970s53. Indeed, the Saudi government had 
no regulatory commission for water treatment, landfills, or asbestos, among other sanitation and 
environmental protection authorities54. At the same time, Saudi Aramco established its own set 
of environmental regulations in the 1960s as a means of curtailing the adverse effects of oil 
production on the environment55. Whether or not Aramco’s regulations were implemented is 
difficult to say, since the company had made an agreement with the Saudi government not 
openly criticize the government’s lack of environmental regulation if this would mean Aramco 
could operate without government inspections56. Both groups operated semi-independently until 
the Saudi government bought a majority share in Aramco in 197357.  
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 As a consequence of a decade of rapid industrial growth, as well as the acquisition of 
Saudi Aramco, the Saudi government began developing environmental guidelines in the 1970s58. 
Around this same time, the first wave of environmental science graduate students returned from 
schools in the U.S. and Europe. These students brought with them a new awareness and 
understanding of the adverse effects that environmental exploitation could have on their 
homeland59.  In addition, Saudi Aramco published the first Saudi environmental report in 197860. 
This report highlighted the biological diversity in the Gulf and argued that oil production 
activities were greatly harming the regional environment61. For example, the study found that 
only 36% of pipelined water was drinkable, and a staggering 85% of land was “severely 
degraded”62. In addition, deforestation and drought in the Hejaz, the region which encompasses 
most of Saudi Arabia’s West Coast and houses the Islamic Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina, 
left almost all land mammals threatened63. In response to this study, the Saudi government 
passed its first five conservation laws and created the Ministry of Agriculture and Wildlife in the 
first state-sponsored effort to curb the adverse effects of anthropogenic climate change64. 
Faisal’s reforms and his support of conservative Wahhabis benefited the discussion 
around preservation and conservation in Saudi Arabia.  Indeed, the revival of traditional 
environmentalism in the 1980s included the reintroduction of the belief that God gave natural 
resources to the state and that the state was obliged to protect these resources while taking 
advantage of them65. Specifically, this meant the revival of hema, a tribal tradition of protecting 
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land and wildlife66. The Saudi government established the Meteorology and Environmental 
Protection Agency (MEPA) in 1981, which incorporated pollution into wildlife and resource 
conservation efforts67. In addition, this group developed the first State of the Environment Report 
in Saudi Arabia68. Completed in 1984, the report was meant to be a reference for judging the 
efficacy of environmental policies. The findings of the 1984 report concluded that standing 
environmental policies were ineffective, and ministerial bodies in charge of these programs had 
not worked to oversee their success6970.  
This inefficiency can be attributed to the self-interest of those within the Saudi 
bureaucracy, who often set easily attainable goals as a means of demonstrating their value to the 
royal family71. Peter Vincent claims that the public “widely ignored” the first laws regarding air 
and water pollutants in 198272. Furthermore, he states that the National Commission for Wildlife 
Conservation and Development (NCWCD), a subsidiary of the MEPA, was “poorly funded” and 
its work largely rejected by the public due to a “very positive attitude towards hunting”73. 
Finally, in 1983, the MAW created a separate Department of National Parks. Although this 
seemed like a practical step toward environmental protection, it further muddled the delineation 
of responsibilities between the MAW, MEPA, and NCWCD74. As a consequence, ministers 
lowered their standards for their authorities. These groups continued to exist through 1985 but 
were little more than figures the Saudi government could point toward as evidence of 
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development. The discrepancy between a public discourse that began to consider environmental 
protection and conservation and actual practical implementation was the outcome of a different 
set of priorities that occupied the Saudi government in this time period. 
Politics of Stability  
From 1960-1985, state-building in the Middle East continued at a rapid pace similar to 
that which immediately followed World War I75. Many Arab states saw opportunities to push for 
political liberalization in the post-independence periods. While political parties and unions were 
formed in many of the regions countries like Egypt, Iraq and Syria, the Saudi monarchy was able 
to maintain its position76. Along with widespread regional liberalization came continued unrest, 
primarily surrounding the young Israeli state. Many countries in the region were apprehensive 
toward Israel, and Israel responded in kind: both sides spent much of this period building 
defenses in response to a perceived threat from the other.  
Although Saudi Arabia was wary of the perceived Israeli threat, it built its defenses 
differently than other Arab States. Instead of spending directly on defense, the Saudi government 
used their “oil weapon” to broker defense deals with other states7778. The Saudis played on 
Western concerns of Soviet influence in the Middle East in convincing the U.S. government to 
purchase F-15 fighter jets for the Saudi Air Force79. When the Saudi government found out that 
the U.S. colluded with Israel during the Six-Day War (1967), Faisal strong-armed the Americans 
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into agreeing to $15.4B in military and defense contracts8081. The only defense contract for 
which Saudi Arabia actively paid was with France from 1979-81, which cost one-third of the 
U.S. contract and came as a response to the U.S.’s failure in mediating peace between Israel and 
Palestine82. This diversification trend continued into the 1980’s, which saw Saudi Arabia sign 
defense contracts with Great Britain, West Germany, and Pakistan83. In this way, the Saudi 
government played upon their value as a strategic partner in a contentious region to convince 
other states to bolster their defenses, rather than spend their own money, which was largely 
derived from oil.  
 Signing a defense contract with France was was seen by the international community as 
Saudi Arabia formally taking its place as the seat of OPEC84. Founded in 1960 by Iran, Iraq, 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela, the goal of OPEC was to stop the continued decrease of 
oil prices that had come as the result of the foundation of multiple transnational oil corporations 
in the 1950s85.  While OPEC was merely a resource rent collection organization for oil-rich 
countries in 1960, it worked through negotiation in the 1960s and 1970s to nationalize oil 
companies and train domestic labor in all facets of oil production and refining86. In this way, 
states were successful at reclaiming their natural resource wealth and retaining more of the oil 
profit than was experienced under previous agreements between transnational oil companies87. 
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Thus, the power of the oil weapon grew stronger as Saudi Arabia worked to gain control over 
domestic production and exportation. 
As a result of their defense deal with Saudi Arabia, France was seen by Arab and 
Western countries involved in the Middle East as more Pro-Arab than the U.S., who openly 
supported the Israeli state8889. From this point forward, the Saudi government continued to work, 
primarily in its own self-interest, alongside OPEC to control their oil output, thus moderating 
fluctuations in price90. Although its specific agenda often did not align with those of the other 
OPEC states, Saudi Arabia controlled more than half of the oil in the non-Communist world91. 
Therefore, they often acted unilaterally in pursuit of the actions that best fit their needs.  
Saudi needs primarily centered around infrastructural development and securing 
investments, without consideration of the effects of inflation92. For example, during the 1960s 
and 1970s, the Saudi Agricultural Development Bank opened the Real Estate Development Fund 
(REDF). The goal of the REDF was to subsidize housing development and cost of living via 
interest-free loans to farmers who agreed to sell their product at a lower cost93. From 1977-1979 
alone, rental costs across Saudi Arabia dropped by 30%, mainly due to REDF loans94. While this 
expansion was effective in meeting the needs of Saudi Arabia operating at an elevated industrial 
capacity, the government did not plan for the event of an economic decline. Coincidentally, as 
the economy slowed in 1982 in reaction to a decline in oil revenue, many of these large-scale 
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development projects were completed95. As a result, the country had more oil production 
infrastructure than it could support, began operating at a lower capacity, and the international oil 
market slacked96. With this excess in new oil infrastructure, Saudi Arabia saw no reason to build 
renewable energy plants, as they could not staff the energy production facilities they did have. 
 Using oil production as a bargaining chip for defense deals and nationalizing oil 
production to secure resource profit and output catalyzed internal development in Saudi Arabia. 
During the transition from pastoral to industrialized state, the Saudi government wanted to 
protect their long-standing relationship with Wahhabi Islam. Rather than moving toward 
liberalization like other Arab states, Faisal affirmed his autocracy with Islam as the official state 
religion9798. This concern for the protection of religion was the Royal family’s reaction to 
increased acceptance of Western values and liberalism as a whole among the Saudi public99. For 
example, Christian services and non-Muslim worship was permitted in private homes and land 
owned by foreign groups, and religious behavior was deinstitutionalized and largely unenforced 
by the civil service ministry throughout the 1960’s and 1970’s100.  
Backed by Aramco, King Faisal’s domestic reforms spurred modernization within Saudi 
Arabia with the intent of maintaining the internal stability his country had enjoyed for years. He 
succeeded in this goal for some time: he abolished slavery, introduced social welfare, allowed for 
the country’s first national television broadcasts, and ruled during the elimination of malaria in 
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Saudi Arabia101102.  Despite this progress, the country began to destabilize when he was 
assassinated by his nephew in 1975103. In the following years, Iranian-backed conservative 
groups pressured the Saudi government to revive their connection with Islam104. In response, the 
new King Khalid increased funding for the mutawiin, a division of civil service that enforced 
“religiously sanctioned behavior”105. While the intent of Faisal’s reforms was to continue the 
stability oil wealth had created, his social reforms were too progressive for the region at the time. 
This political destabilization and momentary transition began an Islamic Revival that would 
impact the country for years to come.  
 Despite the major reform that took place throughout the 1960s and 1970s, oil continued 
to be the primary contributor to the Saudi GDP. While social progress advanced through most of 
this period, the government relied on oil as a means of stabilizing themselves, with no real 
attempt to produce another lucrative industry106. Thus, the state purchase of the majority share in 
Saudi Aramco in 1980 had a stabilizing and destabilizing effect on the Saudi sociopolitical 
landscape for the coming years107108.  
The Dominating Narrative of Oil Reliance 
 Faisal’s reforms from 1960-1985 were grouped into three development plans. Lasting 
five years each, these plans were designed to meet the long-term needs of the Kingdom while 
being short enough to allow for periodic re-evaluation if necessary. The First Development Plan 
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(1970-1975) allocated spending for defense, education, transportation, and utilities109. This plan, 
however, deviated in response to unexpected economic growth from oil revenue110. As the total 
budget for the grew, so did the demand for skilled labor in cities. Thus, funds were re-allocated 
to REDF loans and Saudi Industrial Development Fund (SIDF) loans, which were introduced 
during the Second Development Plan (1975-1980)111. Also, the Second Development Plan called 
for, “free medical service, free education and vocational training…, subsidized prices for 
essential commodities, interest-free credit for people with limited incomes, and extended social 
security benefits”112. In effect, the Second Plan provided more social support for the Saudi public 
and expanded the country’s infrastructure to be able to handle the increased capacity of trading 
being done, primarily surrounding oil113. Even with this increased expense (actual spending was 
40% above the initial $142B estimate and ten times the realized spending of the First Plan), the 
Saudi GDP rose below the ten percent per year goal114. This slow growth was reflective of the 
“slower-than anticipated growth in petroleum production”115. The Third Development Plan 
(1980-1985) continued to raise expenses, this time to counteract potential inflation from 
unforeseen development in the previous decade116. This plan centered around the development of 
skilled domestic labor to operate and maintain the buildings and production sites which were 
currently being developed117. All in all, Faisal’s development plans were well-organized and 
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largely successful. The amount of success for each plan, however, was dependent on oil 
production during each period. 
Saudi reliance on oil as an international bargaining chip from 1960-1985 fostered a 
revolution of rising domestic expectations: that is, the Saudi government embraced their 
newfound power and wealth that stemmed from oil and extended that power and wealth to the 
public through Development Plans. Because of this broadening of power, the Saudis could not 
simply diversify their economy and slow production. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, it was 
apparent that Saudi Arabia was going to continue to invest in oil production as their primary 
national business, for both the present and the future118119. C.I.A. reports indicate that from 1973 
to 1979, the state developed long-term pricing and production strategies aimed at protecting oil 
prices during slack markets and preventing the deterioration of industrialization to the point that 
oil was devalued120. Saudi Arabia framing oil production and policy changes as favors to 
struggling importers in the West from 1973-1977 spurned the initial development of the “oil 
weapon” as a bargaining tool on the global market121. While this harmed other OPEC member 
states whose reserves were depleting rapidly, Saudi Arabia used oil production as another means 
of developing partnerships with Western states122. In exchange, Western countries like Britain, 
France, and the U.S. continued to invest in Aramco and other forms of oil exploration and 
production within Saudi Arabia123.  
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 While Saudi Arabia’s increased reliance on oil production aided their ascent on the global 
stage, their long-term domestic infrastructure and oil policy suffered. Although their oil policy 
decisions reflected a concern for long-term protection of oil production, the government did not 
explore methods aside from limiting production. This narrow scope in exploration of alternatives 
can largely be placed on the shoulders of Saudi Aramco. American intelligence details overly-
optimistic oil production estimates and a lack of testing regarding extraction technology. These 
generous estimates led to explosions at two research facilities in the 1970s124. This optimism, 
combined with the ambitious and reckless application of untested technology, slowed the 
expansion of sustainability projects in the country. At the same time, oil production never 
dropped below ten million barrels of oil per day until the Islamic Revival began in 1979125. 
Initially, this change did not adversely impact Saudi Arabia, who led global oil production during 
the 1979 oil crisis126. Even so, this unforeseen jump in production during the global energy crisis 
led to a slack market until the 1990s127. After this, the oil market dropped, but Saudi Arabia did 
not slow production. Rather than diversifying and further exploring a future in renewables, Saudi 
Arabia used this opportunity to bankrupt its competition. Beginning in 1982, Saudi Arabia 
intentionally drove oil prices down as a means of making the high-cost oil production facilities 
that existed in competitor states less profitable, in effect driving them out of business128. In this 
way, although the oil market was on its way toward collapse in 1985, Saudi Arabia was more 
dependent than ever on oil production. 
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Summary 
Although their environmental organizations were largely ineffective, Saudi Arabia did 
progress toward environmentalism from 1960 to 1985. In response to pressures from the West, 
which was becoming increasingly aware of the relationship between carbon emissions and long-
term environmental damage, and the desire of the Royals to modernize, research institutions like 
the King Fahad University of Petroleum and Minerals and the King Abdulaziz City for Science 
and Technology were built as centers for the research and development of sustainable 
technology129. These facilities worked alongside Saudi Aramco during the 1960s and 1970s to 
produce the Gulf’s first regional environmental report, explore for new resources, and work on 
sustainable energy projects. Yet, oil was still the primary contributor to the Saudi GDP130.  
Despite the oil market continuing to collapse through the 1980s, Saudi Arabia expanded their oil 
production capacity in an effort to eliminate international competition, primarily from other 
OPEC states. In practice, this strategy did not help them gain an edge on their competition. Their 
inability to comprehend the physical limitations of oil enabled the Saudis to improperly prioritize 
oil production above economic diversification and implementation of alternative energy 
production. Thus, while they did develop and had the capacity to install a localized renewable 
energy infrastructure, they continued to use oil simply because they were producing so much of 
it and it was cheaper in the short-term. In turn, their environmental organizations were not able to 
render any sort of true environmental protection, as ministers set unimpressive goals to maintain 
favor with the Saudi Royal family. Overall, King Faisal’s modernization reforms perpetuated a 
cultural narrative of oil reliance. In addition, the existence of powerful religious groups like the 
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Wahhabi ulama and the mutawiin ultimately led to continuation of the status quo. Although they 
continued to rely on oil production in the economy, the new, more religious federal government 
facilitated the re-adoption of traditional concepts of environmentalism in Saudi domestic policy 
during a time when oil prices were plummeting.  
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Chapter III: Progress - 1985-2001 
“Sustainability can’t be like some sort of a moral sacrifice or political dilemma or a 
philanthropical cause. It has to be a design challenge.” 
 
 --Bjarke Ingels131 
  
Introduction  
In the 1980s, the world was geared toward change. From politics to pop culture, the 
public was ready to embrace innovation. Arguably, the most significant change that came out of 
the 1980s was the fall of the USSR. From 1985 to 1989, U.S. President Ronald Reagan and 
Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev worked together to change the international reputation of 
Communism and save Russia’s economic vitality132. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 
effectively ended communism’s Western foothold and also exemplified the success of 
Gorbachev’s hallmark policies, Glasnost and Perestroika. Meaning “Openness” and 
“Restructuring” respectively, these policies focused on economic and political rearrangement 
within the Kremlin as a means of alleviating the struggles of the Russian public133. Despite these 
fundamental changes, the Soviet Union totally collapsed in 1991. 
 The fall of the Soviet Union had a lasting effect on the Middle East. Although U.S.S.R. 
held 15% of the global oil supply at home and was therefore less interested in the Middle East 
than the oil-scarce U.S., the U.S.S.R. played a significant role in shaping the Arab political and 
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social landscape throughout the 1980s and 1990s134. Most notably, the Soviets kept the United 
States in check through disruption in Palestine and Afghanistan. 
 Palestine served two purposes as a proxy war for the Soviets. First, by disrupting the 
Palestinian peace process through the perpetuation of violence, the U.S.S.R. delayed the 
diplomatic success of the U.S. in the Middle East until the mid-1990s. Second, through funding 
Communist sympathizers within the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the Soviets won 
the favor of other Arab countries while promoting their policy interests135.  
 Afghanistan, however, directly involved Soviet forces. After successfully staging a coup 
in 1979, Soviet forces joined the Afghan Communist Party in quelling popular uprising against 
their brutal public policies, such as the execution of political prisoners and murdering unarmed 
civilians136. Although this war formally ended in 1988, decisions made by both the Soviets and 
Americans during this time influence foreign policy today. 
 By 1980, both the Islamic world and global leadership decided to take action against 
Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. That year, the Islamic Conference requested via resolution 
the “immediate, urgent, and unconditional withdrawal of Soviet troops (from Afghanistan).”137.  
Similarly, the United Nations voted 104 to 18 in protest of the involvement of the U.S.S.R.138. As 
a means of combatting Soviet influence without directly declaring war, the United States joined 
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Gulf States in funding insurgent groups known as the Mujahideen139. Agents of Holy War, the 
Mujahideen succeeded in driving the Soviets from Afghanistan by 1989, but not without cost. 
Returning home with a distorted and militaristic understanding of the world, some of the 
mujahideen, primarily from Saudi Arabia, broke from the fold and began their own jihadi group, 
the Taliban140. 
 This chapter will examine the effect that Cold War proxy wars had on the prospects for 
environmentalism in Saudi Arabia from 1985-2001. Specifically, this section aims to analyze the 
rapid regional transition into industrialization, the sub-conflict of balancing tradition with 
Westernization, and the involvement of the international community in Saudi policymaking in 
regard to both regional threats and domestic concerns. From this analysis, I will assert that, while 
the research and development existed, no practical renewable energy infrastructure was in place 
in Saudi Arabia by 2001. This lack of renewable infrastructure is in part due to Saudi pre-
occupation with the imminent threat in Kuwait, as well as changing public opinion regarding the 
monarchy. While there was some forward movement toward developing policies and 
environmental initiatives, Saudi Arabia continued to balk at the prospect of practical large-scale 
implementation of renewable energy at this time.  
Ineptitude of State-Sponsored Environmental Authorities 
 As early as the publication of the First State of the Environment Report in 1985, it was 
evident that the newly-founded environmental authorities were ineffective. Although the MEPA 
set its first federal environmental protection standards in 1982, the 1980s and 1990s were largely 
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dominated by international oil politics. As a result, renewable energy continued in its testing 
phase, and large-scale implementation remained in the distant future.  
 Like the general politics of Saudi Arabia, environmental policy was marked by 
international involvement between 1985 and 2001. There was a “colossal” cost of using oil at 
home rather than exporting it: oil use for infrastructure was growing 8.5% annually in the 1980’s 
and 1990’s. Nevertheless, the Saudis continued to reject this potential for capital gain, favoring 
domestic use of their primary revenue-bearing resource instead141. Domestic overuse of oil, 
however, compounded the excess in international exportation. As the Saudis continued to expand 
oil use in the power, water, and transportation sectors, they also continued to expand their 
production for international export142. The Saudis expanded production with the goal of 
establishing Saudi Arabian dominance in global oil production. This strategy worked, but the 
Saudis lost billions in potential gains from the establishment of this policy in the late 1980s until 
the oil glut in 1998. 
 Similar to their policy on oil production, Saudi environmental authorities were dominated 
by international actors. The Second State of the Environment report, completed in 1989, included 
only pictures, never mentioning anything about the environment in writing143. Following this 
report, the Saudi Crown utilized the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) 
to develop a comprehensive parks and wildlife conservation plan. This plan built upon the 
existing values of the Ministry of Agriculture and Wildlife (MAW), and set goals that were 
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achievable, but more ambitious than those currently in place144. Furthermore, in 1992, Saudi 
Arabia presented for the first time at the United Nations Conference for Economic Development 
(UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro. Here, Saudi Arabia submitted a national report on the status of its 
resources and the environment, which outlined the structure of their environmental management 
administration, as well as existing resource extraction policies and conservation laws145. Further, 
along with 177 other countries, the Saudis signed Agenda 21, a “comprehensive plan of action to 
be taken globally, nationally and locally by organizations of the United Nations System, 
Governments, and Major Groups in every area in which human impacts on the environment.”146 
More specifically, Agenda 21’s goals included accelerating sustainable development through 
influencing social and economic norms, conservation resource development, strengthening the 
role of women, children, and industry leaders, and proposing a means by which this could be 
implemented147.  
 Simply because Saudi Arabia had taken advice from the international community and 
signed a UN action plan did not mean that they kept any of their promises. Although the Crown 
ratified Agenda 21 in 1995, by 1997 it still had not been implemented in any context148. Beyond 
that, Saudi Arabia passed two bills between UNCED and 1997, concerning environmental 
regulations, indicating a mixture of preoccupation with the Persian Gulf War, a concern for its 
subsequent adverse domestic effects, and a general disregard for sustainability as a practice. 
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 One of the reasons environmentalism failed to take off during this period in Saudi Arabia 
was because of the lack of ambition in the heads of the environmental authorities. Eager to 
please the Crown, they continued to set low goals as a means of demonstrating their efficacy. For 
example, Al Gilani and Filor noted in the late 1990’s that,  
“the General Law of the Environment is in the revision stage. This document is being prepared 
by MEPA, and is expected to provide the legal base for environmental policies and laws in Saudi 
Arabia. However, it was halted in the decision-making processes for several years, with 
opposition from other agencies such as MAW and the Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs 
(MoMRA).”149 
 Stalling by the MAW and MoMRA can be interpreted as two standing environmental 
authorities reluctant to see their responsibilities grow. On the other hand, this action represented 
a major step up by the MEPA. Unlike the other state-sponsored environmental authorities in 
Saudi Arabia, the MEPA made marked improvements on the landscape from their establishment 
in 1981 to 2000. According to the UN Global Environmental Outlook, the MEPA had 
experienced success in combatting desertification, reducing natural gas combustion, reducing led 
content in gas used for transportation, industrial recycling, and sustainable development by this 
time150. While the implementation of federal legislation varied, the MEPA had set itself apart as 
the most efficacious environmental authority within the Saudi government. 
 Even though Saudi Aramco maintained its rigorous emissions and environmental 
conservation standards left over from the 1960s, the period between 1985 and 2001 reflects the 
change in ownership. Now owned completely by the Saudis, Aramco operated at the will of the 
House of Saud. The launch of major ecological and environmental initiatives and subsidizing a 
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college preparatory program were the Americans’ last acts as partial owners in Aramco151. When 
the Saudis ratified the complete takeover in 1988, focus shifted from public outreach and 
conservation to unparalleled production. With oil discoveries continuing to be made all over the 
country, Aramco grew its production capacity from 5.4 million barrels per day (bpd) in July 
1990 to 8.4 million bpd by the end of the year152. Furthermore, offshore drilling expanded with 
the 1992 discovery of oil in the Red Sea.  
Still, Aramco continued to make a difference when it came to environmental protection. 
In 1991, Saudi Aramco recovered more than 1.2 million barrels from the Persian Gulf after a 
major oil spill from production fields in Kuwait. Additionally, in 1999, Aramco produced its 
own independent environmental film, “Land of Khuzama”153. Produced in Arabic and English, 
the message of the film centered around “the importance of preserving the environment and 
underscores the need to respect the Kingdom's wildlife.”154. Finally, in 2001, Saudi Aramco 
launched their Environmental Master Plan. This plan involved "funding capital projects aimed at 
improving environmental performance” inside Aramco155. While the enforcement of 
environmental legislation by the Saudi government remained suspect between 1985 and 2001, 
Saudi Aramco continued to be an example of environmental stewardship in the oil and gas 
industry. Although they expanded at the request of their new owners, they continued to monitor 
their contribution to environmental degradation through annual reports, the maintenance of an 
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entire staff dedicated to impact analysis, and expansion of their research and development 
sector156. 
 While 1985-2001 appears to be a period of time marked by ravenous international oil 
consumption, it was also witnessed a growth of Saudi awareness about the environment and its 
fragility. While Saudi Arabia continued to produce enough to maintain its dominance on the 
world oil and gas market, state-sponsored environmental authorities began to move forward with 
the help of international authorities like the IUCN. The largest success of any of these federal 
authorities was the emergence of the MEPA as the primary environmental protection agency 
within Saudi Arabia. During the Gulf War, they worked successfully against other Saudi 
environmental agencies to challenge the country to meet loftier standards. Likewise, Saudi 
Arabia invested heavily in its research and development infrastructure, as well as in various 
projects and initiatives in order to mitigate the adverse effects that oil production has on the 
environment. All in all, by 2001, Saudi Arabia demonstrated promise towards the possibility of 
developing a renewable energy infrastructure. 
Politics of Stability 
 The seizure of the Grand Mosque in 1979 by militants associated with the Wahhabi 
ulama damaged the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Islamic World. In 
response, the Saudi Royals gave more power to the ulama, in hopes that stricter enforcement of 
religious behavior would limit deviations in interpretation. According to Robert Lacey, “(Saudi 
King) Khaled had come to agree with the sheikhs. Foreign influences and bida'a (heresy) were 
the problem. The solution to the religious upheaval was simple – more religion.”157 At this point, 
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it was ambiguous whether the Saudi Royals or Wahhabi ulama held the primary executive power 
within Saudi Arabia. As a result, from 1985 to 2001, the House of Saud declined in popularity, 
both within Saudi Arabia and internationally158. 
 Much of what was going wrong inside Saudi Arabia could have been predicted from its 
actions abroad. During the Iran-Iraq War, Saudi Arabia, along with other Gulf States, supported 
Saddam Hussein. Although he was a tyrant and generally disliked by other Muslim countries, he 
was a favorable alternative to the Ayatollah159. After the war, however, he became a much larger 
threat to the region as a whole. Desperate for money to repay debts and finance reparations from 
the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam began taking oil by military force160. Soon thereafter, the Iraqi 
Regime annexed Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia turned to other states for help. According to Saudi 
King Fahd,  
“We have noticed a massive troop buildup at the border which we share with Iraq and it is 
absolutely necessary that no Iraqi troops exists near that border. This is why we have agreed to 
station foreign and Arab soldiers in Saudi Arabia to help us. These troops will leave as soon as 
the crisis over Kuwait is resolved.”161 
 
The decision to station troops in Saudi Arabia was reported two days after the Iraqi 
military entered Kuwait, indicating anxiety and a sense of urgency from the House of Saud. 
Asking for non-Muslim assistance in defending Islam’s holiest sites, however, was a serious 
violation of Islamic Law162. Adding to the insult was the Royals’ choice to allow the well-funded 
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and equipped Americans to enter and defend Mecca and Medina, rather than young Saudis 
interested in joining the cause to defend their homeland. Among these eager young Saudis was 
Islamic militant and family friend of the House of Saud Osama bin Laden163.  
 Although the presence of non-Muslim troops angered many religious conservatives in the 
region, it sent a clear message of order within Saudi Arabia: the House of Saud held the primary 
power and the Wahhabis occupied subordinate administrative positions. Furthermore, the ulama 
enjoyed authority in religious interpretation, but had no sovereign power. These realities were 
exemplified by the compliance of the ulama in administering a fatwa (religious decree) in 
support of the Saudi decision to allow non-Muslims into Mecca and Medina, claiming that it was 
equally unholy for Muslims to threaten other Muslims164. 
 One might assume that Saudi Arabia and the US were relatively friendly global partners 
throughout the 1990s. After all, the U.S. had exclusive rights to enter Saudi Arabia to protect its 
oil assets165.  Similarly, Saudi Arabia imported 18% of its goods from the U.S., the most of any 
single country166. In reality, however, the relationship between the two powers was contentious: 
the week that the Royals announced the American entrance into Saudi Arabia, distrust was 
cultivated and radicalization spread. Regional news agency Al Dustur posited, “The American 
laws cannot even prevent Jews from joining the military. Therefore, with so many Jews already 
in the US military it is impossible to forestall Jews from coming to Saudi Arabia. They are 
coming in masses, disguised as Americans to kill Arabs.”167 This fear resonated throughout the 
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Muslim world, which was still trying to cope with the permanence of the Israeli state. This task 
had become even more challenging given the recent Israeli tendency towards militarism in 
response to the rise of Hezbollah, HAMAS, and the First Intifada. This regional tension, in 
addition to the foreign presence in Muslim Holy Sites, hindered Saudi prestige within the Gulf 
Region. 
 Like the Saudi Royals faced tension abroad, they began to lose favor among their 
citizens. Upon being pressured to administer the fatwa permitting Americans to enter and defend 
Saudi Arabia, the ulama in other communities began looking elsewhere for leadership. This 
misstep promoted the radicalization of Wahhabi Islam, or neo-Wahhabism, as a separate 
interpretation of Islam168. Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda followed this new form of 
Wahhabism. They believed that the Saudi King was no longer the protector of Islam, and that he 
should be overthrown, and all other enemies of Islam, including the United States, should be 
destroyed169. In 1998, Osama bin Laden repeated the sentiments of Al Dustur, and called for an 
end to the American defense of Saudi Arabia: 
 “We believe that we are men. Muslim men who must have the honor of defending 
(Mecca). We do not want American women soldiers defending (it)… The rulers of the region 
have been robbed of their manhood. And they think that the people are women. By God, Muslim 
women refuse to be defended by these American and Jewish prostitutes.”170 
 
 According to Schwartz, this opinion was common by the late 1990’s in Saudi Arabia171. 
Those individuals who worked in education during Faisal’s reforms in the 1960’s and 70’s also 
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experienced the alignment of Wahhabism with Neo-Salafism, another reformed sect of Islam. 
These events in turn produced the Islamic Awakening172. Following Operations Desert Shield 
and Desert Storm, a visible change in Saudi political language was present, which reflected the 
speech of prominent Revivalist preacher Safar al-Hawali173. This speech considers American 
presence in Saudi Arabia as an insult to the Islamic faith, and declares the true war to be, “not the 
world against Iraq. It is the West against Islam.”174.  
 Both domestically and internationally, the Saudi Crown began to lose its political hold 
between 1985 and 2001. While the House of Saud was, and still is, one of the wealthiest and 
most powerful families in the world, their mishandling of the defense situation during the Persian 
Gulf War led to the deterioration of their relationships with their citizens and other Gulf States. 
As a result, radicalized Wahhabi mujahideen combined with neo-Salafists to turn the public 
against the Crown. By 2001, the Saudi Royals held power in the state, but the neo-Wahhabi 
ulama enjoyed a better relationship with the public. 
The Dominating Narrative of Oil Reliance 
As a means of outlasting global oil competition by increasing their presence in the 
market, Saudi Arabia persuaded OPEC to increase production and drop of the price of oil in 
1986 to $12/barrel, a thirteen-year low175. Previously, Saudi Arabia was hurt by the curtailing of 
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production during the oil embargoes of 1973 and 1979176. The increase in production and 
subsequent reduction in price in 1986 had the opposite effect. While all OPEC states lost revenue 
on the 1986 price gouge, Saudi Arabia was affected the least. Gately notes that, “for Saudi 
Arabia, revenue…declined only slightly: the 50 percent price declines were almost offset by 
increased input. But, for OPEC as a whole, revenue…declined sharply.”177. In short, not only did 
Saudi Arabia use this price drop to strategically undercut other non-OPEC states, but also to 
establish dominance within OPEC itself. 
While this move re-affirmed Saudi dominance in oil production, it also prevented policy 
leaders from diversifying the Saudi industrial profile. In 2000, Cappelen and Choudhury stated 
that, “In spite of the fact that the government on many occasions have expressed the wish for the 
economy to be more diversified away from the oil related industries, oil has dominated the 
economy, and still does.”178 They also point out that, under this new strategy of decreasing prices 
and increasing output, it was no longer economically viable to continue to employ a majority of 
the population and employ a generous welfare system179. While the Saudis continued to strive for 
international recognition, they did so in a way that perpetuated a reliance on oil. 
The alliance between the Wahhabi ulama and House of Saud also depended in part on the 
success of oil. The Saudi Royals had long funded the agenda of the ulama using the money they 
received from oil profits (around $3B USD annually since 1975)180.  In exchange, the ulama 
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often overlooked actions of the Crown that violated religious law via issuing fatwas for 
international dealings, jihad, and other acts which they typically frowned upon181. With the 
financial support they received from the Crown, the ulama extended their reach further into the 
Gulf Region and cemented their claim as the predominant religious scholars within Saudi Arabia. 
By the time they were at war with Iraq, the ulama had diversified their income to include other 
wealthy families in the Gulf. When Saudi Arabia went to war with Iraq, revivalist groups, mainly 
from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other Arab jihadi groups, supported Iraq182. Expanding their 
funding base allowed the Wahhabi ulama to rely less on the House of Saud. Thus, when the 
Saudi Royals pressured them to issue a fatwa for American defense, the ulama began to push 
away from the Crown. In doing this, their constituency followed183. 
Although the ulama distanced themselves from the House of Saud, the two parties 
remained connected through the state administration. Oil continued to be at the center of the 
relationship and could often predict its nature. For example, as the ulama and Saudi Crown grew 
apart, the oil market became more and more volatile. Finally, in 1998, oil prices and the Saudi-
ulama relationship both tanked. After failing to reach an agreement to slow production and soak 
up the excess oil on the global market, OPEC allowed the global price of oil to reach a 25-year 
low184.  
At the same time, the Neo-Wahhabi Movement, a radicalized form of Wahhabi Islam, 
developed. The main difference between the two groups is the means by which they achieved 
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their goals185. Neo-Wahhabism lashed back at the House of Saud and the Wahhabi ulama, and 
separated itself as a new religious sect. The ulama in the Nejd formed this new movement, 
calling for “the formation of a shura council, the review of the laws' compatibility with Islamic 
shari‘a, the just distribution of public funds and the restructuring of media and of foreign policy, 
away from alliances (with non-Muslim) not sanctioned by shari’a.”186. In addition, this group 
was more violent than the traditional Wahhabis. Many neo-Wahhabis fought against the Soviet 
Union alongside Afghans during the Soviet-Afghan War in the 1980’s. The Saudis returned 
home not only with a greater understanding of world politics, but also a more violent 
worldview187. As a result of this newfound worldview and confidence in combat, when Saudi 
Arabia needed to defend against the Iraqi threat, the neo-Wahhabis, particularly Al-Qaeda 
founder Osama bin Laden, believed they were the rightful protectors of Islam’s holiest sites188. 
When they were denied this right, they included the Saudi Crown and United States of America 
among those who had committed holy atrocity, and thus must be destroyed189. In 1996, bin 
Laden declared war on the United States. While the Clinton Administration reacted indifferently, 
the well-established and continually-growing Al-Qaeda moved forward with recruiting young 
men across the Gulf Region190. 
From 1985 to 2001, the relationship between the House of Saud and the Wahhabi ulama 
closely followed the trends of the oil market. Therefore, in watching the oil market lurch into its 
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eventual depression in 1998, the ulama were at their greatest odds with the Saudi Royals in 
nearly 2 centuries. Furthermore, the ulama’s religious education and expansion backfired. Arabs, 
both within Saudi Arabia and around the Gulf, who were brought up on the religious teachings 
used by the ulama during the educational reform of the 1960s and 70s, began to follow neo-
Wahhabism. The ulama interpreted the actions of the Saudi Crown, and their endorsement by the 
Wahhabi, as dissonant from their elementary religious teachings. In turn, the Saudi public looked 
to a body that was more consistent with the religion on which they were raised.  Therefore, 
instead of embracing new, Western methods of energy production, the Saudi public reaffirmed 
their preference for oil. 
Summary 
 In short, the period from the purchase of Aramco to the launch of their Environmental 
Master Plan, Saudi Arabia underwent substantial change politically, socially, and economically. 
While the Saudi Crown used its oil wealth to oversaturate the global market and outlast 
international competition, it also lost prestige at home with the rise of the neo-Wahhabi 
movement. At the instruction of the neo-Wahhabists, the public turned to tradition instead of 
modernization. Following this trend, both the monarchy and the people of Saudi Arabia rejected 
renewable technology, and once again turned to oil as their primary economic driver. Despite 
this rejection, environmental awareness grew among the people. Involvement from foreign 
interest groups led to the first set of comprehensive conservation policies in Saudi Arabia. Also, 
accountability at the federal level was promoted by the increased activity of the MAW. Finally, 
Saudi Aramco continued its tradition of environmental excellence, and integrated sustainable 
policies into their public outreach campaign as a means of promoting public information. 
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Chapter IV: Perseverance - 2001-2010 
“We are active, fellow countrymen, in the wider international sphere within the 
framework of the United Nations. We are committed to the UN charter, we reinforce its 
endeavors. Our acts have reflected, and will continue to reflect, our sense of belonging to the 
world community.” 
 
--King Fahd of Saudi Arabia191 
 
Introduction 
 The 1980s and 1990s saw Saudi Arabia act in ways that indicated exceptionalism on the 
world stage. Ian Tyrrell’s definition of exceptionalism as applied to America also describes the 
Saudi case well:  
“American exceptionalism is not the same as saying the United States is "different" from other 
countries. It doesn't just mean that the U.S. is "unique." Countries, like people, are all different 
and unique, even if many share some underlying characteristics. Exceptionalism requires 
something far more: a belief that the U.S. follows a path of history different from the laws or 
norms that govern other countries. That's the essence of American exceptionalism: The U.S. is 
not just a bigger and more powerful country — but an exception.”192 
 
On the oil market, Saudi Arabia exerted its will on competing producers. Disregarding the needs 
of other OPEC members, it flooded the oil market until it was the only producer able to remain 
in business. Similarly, attitudes toward foreign militaries, particularly that of America, 
demonstrate that the Saudi public believed they could defend the Holy Land on their own against 
Saddam Hussein. Further, more conservative Saudi Islamic groups saw the allowance of foreign 
militaries on their soil as a form of insult by the Saudi government, who rejected domestic 
contractors in favor of permitting Western forces to fight the Iraqis.  
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 At home, however, Saudi Arabia was much less stable than it was portraying to the rest 
of the world. An internal power struggle between the neo-Wahhabi ulama and the House of Saud 
demonstrated a need for a clear delineation of power in Saudi Arabia. At first, the ulama came 
out on top, due to their closeness to the Saudi public and control over the national madrasas. 
This sent a message to the House of Saud that the neo-Wahhabists could now stand alone and 
were not afraid to exercise their power in attempts to establish their primacy over the Saudi 
government. 
At the same time, the world was becoming more aware of the damage that conventional 
industrial practices did to the environment. Inspired in part by the oil spills and fires that 
occurred during the Kuwait War, environmental movements transitioned from country-specific 
actions to worldwide initiatives. This transition culminated in the Kyoto Protocol. This 
resolution, passed by the United Nations in 1997, aimed to alleviate anthropogenic climate 
change through a reduction in oil consumption by industrialized nations193. Since recent research 
tied anthropogenic climate change to use of carbon-based fuels like oil, concerns were raised 
about the effects of international legislation like the Kyoto Protocol on the global oil market.  
This chapter intends to explore the effects that international legislation had on the global 
oil market from 2001-2010. From there, the Saudi response to fluctuations in oil demand is 
measured via analysis of the Seventh and Eighth National Development Plans, as well as select 
policies which existed prior to the Seventh Plan. Additionally, the dynamic relationship between 
the ulama and House of Saud is further explored. Finally, Saudi progress toward a diversified 
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economy is evaluated in the context of changing cultural values, as well as the promotion of the 
domestic science and technology industry. 
Ineptitude of State Sponsored Environmental Authorities 
 From 2001-2010, Saudi Arabia continued to use oil as the primary fuel source for 
building their nation. This usage is reflected in the near-tripling of oil consumption in the power, 
water, and transportation sectors during that time194. Although the population expanded 
considerably, the carbon dioxide emitted during that time reflects the continued inefficiency of 
environmental authorities: by 2010, oil use and emissions clean-up cost the Kingdom 137% of its 
annual revenue195. Furthermore, estimates by the World Resources Institute and Institute of 
Energy Economics Japan indicate that since the turn of the century, nearly all carbon emissions 
in Saudi Arabia can be contributed to three energy sectors: electricity, construction, and 
transportation196. Accordingly, total domestic oil consumption increased from 105 MT to 160 
MT, and total environmental damage (combined weight of carbon emissions and waste) 
increased from 400,000,000 to 500,000,000 MT in the nine-year span197. 
 According to the IMF, World Bank, and World Resources Institute, this increase in 
environmental damage is correlated with increased industrialization and economic activity in 
Saudi Arabia 198. As environmental damage increased from 2001-2010, GDP per capita increased 
as well (from 35,000 to 60,000 SAR)199. Beyond that, Taher and Al-Hajjar claim that the 
increases in total environmental damage and per capita income in Saudi Arabia occurred pari 
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pasu200. From this, it can be inferred that the Saudi government used oil to meet the 
infrastructural needs of their growing population, without consideration of the long-term damage 
it would have on the environment. This makes sense when it is considered that, from 2001-2010, 
much of the environmental damage done by Saudi Arabia was not through solid waste. Rather, 
more than two-thirds of the damage done in this time was through carbon emissions201. Rather 
than pile up in landfills, carbon emissions manifest themselves in more subtle ways: through acid 
rain, alterations to regional temperature and water supply, and smog, among others. These effects 
can in turn destroy buildings, destabilize regional agriculture, and toxify the air in and around 
cities over the course of hundreds of years. Given that this was known in 2001, why did the 
Saudi government choose to build their infrastructure on oil? 
 Mainly, because oil was the most available (and subsequently, least expensive) 
resource202. Although 2001 was a relative low for GDP per capita and global oil price, Saudi 
Arabia continued to enjoy the largest combined oil and natural gas reserves in the world203. The 
global oil market, however, remained flooded from Saudi Arabia’s actions in the 1990s. 
Therefore, Saudi Arabia also had an interest in reducing oil exports in 2001 as a means of driving 
the export price upward. Their production, however continued to increase through 2010204205. 
This increase occurred because, instead of reducing production, Saudi Arabia turned inward and 
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used the oil at home. This shift in energy sourcing meant that they would not have to cut the 
growing domestic labor force at the refineries and derricks and could funnel more resources into 
expanding cities and investing in science and technology.  
Beyond that, photovoltaic (PV) solar panels were still not reliable enough to be 
implemented on a large-enough scale to justify the financial investment206. Alawaji states that, 
even though 20-30 renewable energy products were underway in Saudi Arabia by 2001, none of 
them could match the energy production efficiency of oil207. Furthermore, energy subsidies 
existed for oil-based production, but not renewables, making the purchase of renewable energy at 
the residential level unreasonable208. Additionally, reports done in 2001 concluded that PV-
driven water desalination plants were only economically feasible in remote areas where oil-based 
energy production did not already reach, and often failed due to system error209. Also, PV-based 
electricity production was not ready for large-scale implementation because of its cost and 
maintenance requirements: they could only be implemented in population-dense cities like 
Riyadh due to their high development cost and required constant cleaning due to the dusty desert 
environment210. All in all, it was simply easier for the Saudi government to ignore the long-term 
externalities associated with oil-based energy consumption, and once again forego the 
implementation of renewable projects.  
 This sentiment was reflected in the policies and actions of the Saudi environmental 
organizations from 2001-2010. The Seventh and Eighth National Development Plans (2000-2004 
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and 2005-2009, respectively) focused on stabilizing internal migration in Saudi Arabia as a 
means of slowing the country’s rapid urbanization and maintaining the agricultural industry211. 
Thus, environmental considerations in policy took a step back, as economic prosperity and 
infrastructural development was championed212. 
 The Saudi government did, however, make some progress in terms of environmental 
regulation. This progress was largely made within the context of the Seventh and Eighth 
National Development Plans and meant to promote a safe living environment in the Kingdom. 
The first movement toward regulation in this period was the establishment of the Presidency of 
Meteorology and the Environment (PME). In 2001, this federal agency introduced the General 
Environmental Law and Rules for Implementation, which “introduced the first comprehensive 
legal framework in Saudi Arabia for the management of environmental impacts from industrial 
facilities and projects”213. Although the program was comprehensive and did bring about a 
newfound interest in environmental policy among Saudi policymakers, the laws were poorly 
enforced, and did not gain traction as a result214. Like the General Environmental Law, the PME 
failed to enforce the Kyoto Protocol in 2005. Although the Saudi government signed it, they did 
openly acknowledge that the Kyoto Protocol hurt their revenue stream: Oil Minister Ali Al-
Naimi claimed that Saudi Arabia would lose $19 billion annually by 2010 in reduced exports to 
industrialized nations215. In addition, Saudi Arabia developed the Saudi Environmental Society 
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(SENS) in 2006 as a means of promoting green practices in the private sector216. The group is 
purely dedicated to research and is run as a government organization. Therefore, it only offers 
solutions to the issues of private businesses and does not acknowledge the contribution of the 
Saudi government to environmental damage. Also, although the Eighth National Development 
Plan did not provide solutions, it did acknowledge the need for long-term strategy in the 
depletion of natural resources, especially water217. Further, it did acknowledge the need for 
advancement in the science and technology industries as a means of keeping up with 
international competition, although it did not specifically link this to existing renewable projects 
218. Finally, in 2009, the Saudi government opened the King Abdullah University of Science and 
Technology, which dedicated itself to postgraduate research in environmentally-friendly energy 
production219. Thus, although Saudi Arabia did make some contributions toward environmental 
research and policy, their laws did not have strict enforcement behind them, and companies were 
largely allowed to continue with business as usual220. 
 Unlike the Saudi government, Saudi Aramco was able to enact positive environmental 
change in their business practices. Their Environmental Master Plan was endorsed in 2001, and 
95% complete by 2011221. The $3.3 billion project aimed to reduce the release of pollutants and 
enhance the effectiveness of remediation, waste management, and environmental monitoring222. 
                                                 
216 Azhar, Bushra. (2012). “The Top 7 Environmental Movers and Shakers of Saudi Arabia.” Retrieved from: 
https://www.greenprophet.com/2012/02/environmental-movers-shakers-saudi-arabia/ 
 
217 Al-Rushaid, 2010.  
218 Ibid.  
219 Kte'pi, B. (2012). Saudi arabia. In S. Philander (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Global Warming & Climate Change (Vol. 
1, pp. 1236-1236). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications Ltd. doi: 10.4135/9781452218564.n616 
 
220 Visser & Tolhurst, 2010. 
221 Hejazi, R. (2010) “Environmental Challenges and Opportunities at Saudi Aramco.” [PowerPoint]. Retrieved 
from: http://qc.cme-mec.ca/download.php?file=gfqta8cm.pdf 
 
222 Ibid. 
 57 
Primarily, this project was completed through technological innovation involving the natural 
world. For example, by 2010 Aramco had desulfurized their emissions and controlled their waste 
management through the use of Alkaline solutions and bacteria, both of which were 
environmentally neutral and readily available in the Kingdom223. The Environmental Master Plan 
funds hundreds of projects like these, with the aim of promoting comprehensive environmental 
stewardship224. Existing projects range from marine and coastline protection to worker safety in 
waste treatment facilities225. Due to their strategy and long-term planning before the turn of the 
century, Aramco enacted their Environmental Master Plan more effectively than the Saudi 
government did their General Environmental Law. Furthermore, Aramco’s history of 
environmental stewardship allowed for stricter enforcement of their policies than Saudi Arabia, 
who prioritized urban development and planning from 2001-2010. 
Politics of Stability 
 Coming into 2001, the delineation between the power of the neo-Wahhabi ulama and the 
Saudi Royal Family continued to blur. Saudi Arabia adopted the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 2001, under the condition that 
they would not act on “any clause in the agreement that contradicts Islamic sharia”226. Similarly, 
the Saudi legal system maintained its adherence to corporal and capital punishment for felonies 
and most petty crime227. Beyond that, the mutawiin continued to enforce laws concerning the 
practice of non-muslim religions, often arresting Christian groups because their services were too 
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large to be considered private228. Even other forms of Islam were prohibited: Shia Muslims, who 
constituted roughly eight percent of the Saudi population in 2001, were routinely discriminated 
against in jobs, religious freedom, and in daily life229. This discrimination led to several violent 
incidents between the mutawiin and Shia Saudis in 2001230. In response, the public began to fear 
the ulama and turn away from their teachings. As a result, the position of the ulama was 
hindered entering the new century.  
 Like the House of Saud, the Saudi public also lost faith in the ulama following 9/11. The 
attack on the World Trade Center was carried out by mostly Saudi nationals and led by Wahhabi 
Muslim and Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.  Many foreigners, particularly Americans, 
became aware of this fact and began to view Wahhabism, and Islam in general, as a “doctrine of 
terrorism and hate”231. Knowing that this destroyed their relationship with their close ally and 
protector during the Gulf War, the Royal family worked quickly to separate themselves from the 
Wahhabists. Crown Prince Abdullah held televised meetings with various religious and industrial 
leaders in Saudi Arabia to discuss strategies for preventing future incidents232. The outcome of 
these meetings was a clear explanation of the roles of rulers and religious scholars in Saudi 
Arabia: The Royal family was to rule, and the ulama were to advise233.  
 Rather than subdue religious extremism, the actions of the Crown Prince agitated Al-
Qaeda. The years following 9/11 saw an uptick in suicide bombings and attacks on non-Muslim 
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foreigners (roughly 30% of the Saudi population at the time)234235. The Saudi government’s 
initial reaction to this was continued punishment of the ulama and openness to public opinion. 
The Royal Family held “National Dialogues” with “Shiites, Sufis, liberal reformers, and 
professional women”236. Furthermore, King Abdullah expanded the Council of Senior Scholars, 
his formal council of religious advisors, to include religious leaders from more schools within 
Sunni Islam237. Finally, in 2009, the king cemented his primacy over the ulama by decreeing that 
only religious scholars who were “officially approved” by the federal government could issue 
fatwas in Saudi Arabia238. 
 While King Abdullah used this opportunity to attack the Wahhabists and establish his 
family’s power over the state religious institution, others in the House of Saud used the terror 
attacks in the early 2000’s to attack a much larger, and older enemy of the state. Led by Minister 
of the Interior Prince Nayef, some in the Saudi Royal Family attacked the presence of the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Saudi Arabia239. They claimed that, while the Brotherhood had enjoyed 
decades of proliferation and support from Saudi oil revenue, they also spread a message of hate 
and extremism240. Also, independent investigator John Mintz and American journalist Douglas 
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Farah claim that the Brotherhood used money donated by the Saudi government to grow their 
operation in the U.S. and rise to prominence in both religion and industry in America241.  
Understanding these facts in the wake of 9/11, Prince Nayef called for the expulsion of the 
Muslim Brotherhood from Saudi Arabia, calling them “the source of all the problems in the 
Islamic world”.242 
 While establishing their dominance over religion, the Saudi government also used their 
oil revenue to meet the needs of its rapidly-growing population. From 2001-2010, oil production 
was erratic, but never dropped below 8 million barrels/day, more than double that of any other 
OPEC member243. Although their economy was too reliant on oil to be considered diversified, 
Saudi non-oil GDP grew 4.5% annually between 1999 and 2009, representing a steady trend 
away from economic dependence on oil244. The Seventh and Eighth National Development Plans 
served to continue this trend and slow the urbanization of the country. The Seventh Plan, enacted 
from 2000-2004, aimed at promoting regional investments from the private sector by enhancing 
the infrastructural efficiency in rural areas, and establishing public information centers in each 
region245. While they enjoyed the largest GDP in the Arab world, Saudi Arabia was intent on 
using their income to enable its population to raise its own standard of living. From the Sixth to 
the Seventh Plan, budget cuts were made in infrastructure and social/health development, while 
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increases were made to economic and human resource development246. In both plans, human 
resource development accounted for over 50% of the budget247. The goal of this was to promote 
private business and equip domestic workers with the tools necessary to create and promote 
successful businesses apart from the government. On one hand, this program widened access to 
public education, allowed for greater export potential, and expanded Saudi Arabia’s global 
transfer of and contribution to technology. On the other hand, this program brought about 
increased imports and thus inflation, and required expatriate labor for various aspects of 
technological management and production248.  
 The Eighth Plan was more sophisticated than the Seventh, and focused on the 
globalization of new domestic businesses, and building a balanced infrastructure to spread 
wealth to more rural regions, thus promoting industry outside of major cities249. This 
supplemental transition is reflected in the reduction of investment in human resources and 
social/health development, and budget increases in economic resources and infrastructural 
development250. The chosen foundation for the new Saudi economy, science and technology, 
required training and skilled labor251. Thus, the Saudi government built and opened schools like 
the KAUST during the Seventh Plan, and facilitated their graduates opening businesses in the 
Eighth Plan. Thus, Saudi Arabia prevented their most educated youth from moving abroad and 
enhanced their competitiveness on the global market252. This transition alleviated concern over 
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the erraticism of Saudi business cycles, and reduced, but did not eliminate, the domination of oil 
in the Saudi economy253.   
The Dominating Narrative of Oil Reliance 
The Seventh and Eighth National Development Plans encouraged infrastructural growth 
and economic diversification via the promotion of the private sector but did not do so enough to 
deliver Saudi Arabia from their traditional mono-economy254. Rather, job growth, in addition to 
oil production centers, was concentrated in areas that would supplement the expansion of oil and 
energy jobs. These areas included construction in and around cities, and non-manufacturing 
services like public transportation, real estate, and social services255. Thus, job growth was 
limited to only sectors that would bring the public closer to oil production. Rather than promote 
industrial growth in rural areas, this plan facilitated the expansion of urban centers, and drove the 
demand for energy in residential areas up through 2010. 
 From 2001-2010, many Saudis were employed by the government, but relatively few 
entered the social sector. In response, Saudization became a priority with the Seventh Plan256. 
This practice, first introduced in the Fourth Plan, stated that companies operating in Saudi Arabia 
were required to hire a certain number of Saudi laborers257. In 2003, if a private business were to 
employ 20 or more workers, 30% of the company’s employees were required to be Saudi 
nationals258. While this plan seemed like a motivator for private businesses and an opportunity 
                                                 
253 Ramady, Reforms, 2010. 
254 Ibid. 
255 Ibid. 
256 Ramady, Saudization, 2010. 
257 Wynbrandt, J. (2010). “Public Projects.” In A Brief History of Saudi Arabia. pp. 298. New York: Infobase.  
 
258 Ibid. 
 63 
for educated Saudi nationals, it was not an effective means of stimulating the workforce. In 2003, 
only 300,000 Saudis were employed in private businesses with more than 20 employees259.  
 This number did not change, and the emphasis on Saudization was ineffective through 
2010. Ramady claims that Saudization did not improve for a number of reasons. First, he notes 
that negative attitudes around manual labor, coupled with a large expatriate workforce, made 
many of the growing job fields unattractive to Saudi nationals260. Next, he explains that “the 
combination of importing foreign workers while offering generous state welfare benefits to 
nationals has reinforced this negative attitude towards work and created a vicious cycle that 
encourages Saudis to stay out of a large part of the job market”261. Evidence of this point is noted 
by the Ministry of Labor, which saw 150,000 Saudis not show up for guaranteed private sector 
jobs from 2005-2009262.  
While Saudization did not take off with the main workforce, there was some indication 
that it would improve in the longer term. Ramady and Wynbrandt estimate that 70-75% of Saudi 
nationals were employed in 2007263264. In addition, the younger generation appears to be more 
realistic in their expectations for job prospects; many men and women entering the workforce at 
the end of the Eighth Development Plan indicated a willingness to work in jobs typically rejected 
by their fathers. This newfound flexibility in occupation based on gender meant that Saudi 
Arabia would be more able to fill jobs requiring manual labor and more direct services, such as 
hotel and restaurant management265. Likewise, Saudi women were beginning to take jobs in the 
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houses of other Saudi families, a job that was traditionally filled by foreign women266. This 
change in cultural acceptance of jobs allowed for the mobilization of the Saudi public. Beyond 
that, this change can be explained in relation to oil output at the time. 
Oil production from 2001-2010 was erratic, unpredictable, and dominated by global 
trends. The early 2000s saw the world enter recession and reduce oil trade in response to slowing 
economic growth267. For the first time since the 1970s, the Saudi government limited their oil 
production in response to external factors, and not as a means of controlling the price of oil or 
punishing other states268. Saudi oil production finished at 8.5 million barrels/day in 2003, 
climbed quickly to nearly 9.5 million in 2005, and shot back down to 8 million in 2009269. At the 
2008 fixed price of $147/barrel, this fluctuation accounted for $220,500,000 in lost revenue in 
2009 alone270. Similarly, for exports to the U.S. alone, crude petroleum values fluctuated from 
$13B in 2001, to $46B in 2008, and back down to $27B in 2010 in response to the collapse of 
the housing market in 2007271. In response to unstable global demand, Saudi Arabia finished the 
decade with no significant difference in oil production from where it started272.  
Like the recession, the global realization of the immediacy of the climate change issue 
also affected international oil trade. In 2001, the public considered climate change “a problem for 
the future”273. Contrary to this belief, melting ice caps, drying rivers, and increasing global 
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temperatures brought the world face-to-face with this problem sooner than the public thought 
possible. In response, countries began to search for alternative methods of energy production as a 
means of promoting environmental stewardship. Rather than resist the trend of alternate fuel 
exploration, Saudi Arabia joined the fight against climate change. While openly condemning 
international laws that would negatively affect global oil consumption, Saudi Arabia continued 
to invest and explore alternative energy through international technological exchange and 
investment of projects at the KAUST274. While they continued to depend on oil as the primary 
driver of their economy, it appears that Saudi Arabia experienced a transition in their mindset 
from 2001-2010. This transition centered around the realization that oil, although abundant, is a 
finite resource. In conjunction with that realization, the worldwide exploration for new sources 
of energy meant a likely eventual downturn in the oil market once a cheaper, more abundant, or 
more efficient fuel source was discovered.  
In sum, Saudi Arabia initiated the transition into becoming a globalized member of 
society by being forced to respond to instability in the international oil market. Their response 
was the beginning of a cultural shift away from dependence on oil, facilitated by a change in 
views of traditional jobs. Inspired by Abdullah’s emphasis of pre-existing but rarely-enforced 
Saudization policies, young people and women sought jobs previously deemed undesirable by 
Saudi nationals. As a result, the Saudi economy, although still dominated by oil, underwent 
substantial diversification under the Seventh and Eighth National Development Plans. Although 
diversification was not widespread enough to witness other businesses reach the prominence of 
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oil in the Saudi GDP, modest initial gains in the service and construction industries were 
sufficient starts to perpetuate the industrial diversification trend in the late 2000s.  
Summary  
In conclusion, if the 1980s and 1990s were a period of Saudi exceptionalism, the 2000s 
were a period of integration and assimilation on the world stage. While the last chapter detailed 
the rise of the neo-Wahhabi movement and the deterioration of the power of the Royal Family, 
this chapter explains that the early 2000s saw the reversal of this trend, and the re-establishment 
of the House of Saud as the definitive power in Saudi Arabia. Due to damage done to the global 
Saudi reputation during 9/11, the Saudi government worked to distance the state from the neo-
Wahhabi movement, and reclaim their position of power over the ulama.  
 The Saudization process was closely related to a growing understanding in Saudi Arabia 
that oil was not going to last forever. A program existent since the 1980s, Saudization was only 
loosely enforced until the 2000s, when the government realized that it could not run its country 
reliably in the future if it were dependent on the oil market. Various global energy crises forced 
the Saudi government to emphasize Saudization and the advancement of the private sector. The 
combination of promoting both Saudization and private business inspired young Saudis to take 
on new jobs and opened the door for a broader cultural shift away from oil reliance.  
 The waning Saudi dependence on oil reliance can be explained by the global trend away 
from carbon-based fuel, inspired by a new understanding of climate change. Beginning with the 
Kyoto Protocol, countries around the world accepted their responsibility in producing an 
immediate global threat in anthropogenic climate change, and initiated exploration into 
mitigating risk and alleviating carbon footprint. While Saudi Arabia resisted the Kyoto Protocol 
and other legislation that would damage the oil market, they understood that climate change was 
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a threat to the security of their population. So, they opened the KAUST in 2009 with the goal of 
engaging in the global fight against climate change, both as a means of attracting young Saudi 
skilled laborers to stay in-country and promoting science and technology as another lucrative 
domestic industry to balance the Saudi economy. Despite this progress, oil remained the majority 
contributor to the Saudi GDP abroad, and the most-used fuel for energy production at home 
through 2010. No competitive clean fuel reached market by 2010, and as a result, oil continued 
to drive Saudi expansion as it met the needs of its growing population. 
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Chapter V: Conclusion - 2010-2018 
“Our country is rich in its natural resources. We are not dependent solely on oil for our 
energy needs. Gold, phosphate, uranium, and many other valuable minerals are found beneath 
our lands. But our real wealth lies in the ambition of our people and the potential of our younger 
generation.  They are our nation’s pride and the architects of our future. We will never forget 
how, under tougher circumstances than today, our nation was forged by collective determination 
when the late King Abdulaziz Al-Saud – may Allah bless his soul – united the Kingdom. Our 
people will amaze the world again.” 
 
--Mohammad bin Salman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud, Chairman of the Council of Economic 
and Development Affairs275  
 
 
Introduction 
 This thesis explained that, from 1960-2010, a prevalent research and development 
infrastructure for renewable energy existed within Saudi Arabia. Despite a half-century in the 
development phase, this infrastructure was never implemented on a large scale due to the 
ineffectiveness of state-sponsored environmental authorities, a natural desire for political 
stability from the monarchy, and a culture of oil reliance within the country. For fifty years, the 
country ignored warnings from the rest of the world regarding the continued use and dependence 
on oil, both economically and in energy production. There began a change, however, in the 21st 
century: although oil still prevailed as the driving force of the Saudi economy and the leading 
producer in the energy sector, the Seventh and Eighth National Development Plans pushed 
economic diversification in Saudi Arabia. With an intentional focus on the private sector, the 
House of Saud promoted domestic employment through foreign investment by requiring that 
every business hire a percentage of their workforce from Saudi Arabia. Further, education was 
promoted through the foundation of national research universities like the KAUST. The goal in 
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founding these universities was to explore and understand the different natural resources in Saudi 
Arabia and retain the country’s brightest youths, who typically went abroad for secondary 
education. As a result, Saudi Arabia began to fully comprehend the role renewables could play in 
domestic energy production.  
 This chapter concludes the thesis by explaining how the Saudi mindset on energy 
completed its transition from oil-dependent to renewable-focused, evidenced by the Ninth and 
Tenth Development Plans, as well as Vision 2030. The chapter then explains that, while politics 
and culture were traditionally hindrances to the large-scale implementation of a renewable 
energy infrastructure in Saudi Arabia, the social change and economic diversification that 
occurred from 2001-2010 allowed for the introduction of a more renewable-friendly 
development plan. Finally, this chapter will look into the future through the lens of “Vision 
2030”, the Saudi long-term energy conversion initiative. 
Creation of Opportunity within Environmental Authorities 
 While the half-century prior did not produce significant environmental protection policies 
within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the federal government was active in pursuing 
environmentally-friendly policies from 2010 to the present. To accomplish this, they seized the 
window of social openness to change that presented itself in response to the growing domestic 
job market and cultural changes discussed in chapter 4.  
 Movement toward environmental policies, however, continues to move slowly. Even in 
2017, the Kingdom produced less than one percent of its energy using renewable resources276. 
Despite this, advances have been made in other areas since 2010 which represent movement 
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toward an environmentally-friendly Saudi state. More impressive is that leadership for these new 
initiatives has come from the federal level. For example, much of the plan for development since 
2010 has followed policies aimed at promoting the individual laborer and private sector, while 
balancing infrastructural progress across regions. Mohamed Ramady outlines the Ninth National 
Development Plan, claiming that goals from 2010-2014 included, “raising the standard of living 
of citizens, diversifying the economic base, moving toward a knowledge-based economy, and 
achieving balanced regional development”277.  
In this policy, it is evident that the House of Saud recognized that the Seventh and Eighth Plans 
succeeded in improving everyday life in Saudi Arabia through horizontal growth in business and 
continued to use those ideas in the Ninth Plan and beyond. 
 The Tenth Development Plan (2015-2019) continued the successes of the Seventh, 
Eighth, and Ninth Plans. Many of its goals were recycled from the previous policies: the House 
of Saud still felt that development of the private sector, promotion of foreign investment, and 
spending on infrastructure and oil production was the way in which the Kingdom should 
move278. Added to this plan, however, was the resource exploration and sustainability objective. 
In short, this objective focuses on, “raising the value added of natural resources in the national 
economy, diversifying their sources and ensuring their sustainability along with protecting the 
environment and conserving the wildlife”279. Methods by which the Saudi government plans on 
meeting this objective include continuing to maximize the efficiency of oil, but also improving 
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their conservation habits280. Furthermore, the House of Saud called for the monitoring of 
agricultural water use, looking into energy production via solid waste, and developing stricter 
anti-pollution regulations281. Although oil is still recognized as the central driver of the Saudi 
economy and energy grid, the Tenth Plan serves as a concrete timeline to which the House of 
Saud can be held. Now, it will be considered a failure if the Saudi government does not show 
improvements in water conservation, oil efficiency, and air pollution.  
Further evidence of Saudi Arabia’s commitment to the environment, and advancement of 
the state as a whole, is their Vision 2030 project. Introduced in April 2016 by Crown Prince 
Mohammad bin Salman, this program emphasized the goals of the Tenth Plan and outlined their 
implementation for the decade after the plan expired. Vision 2030 consists of three pillars: 1. 
Maintaining status as the center of the Islamic World, 2. Becoming a “global investment 
powerhouse”, and 3. Using waterways to stimulate trade282. Smaller goals mentioned include 
diversification of the energy profile through increased domestic mineral exploitation and the 
development of a sovereign wealth fund from the Public Investment Fund283. The Saudi decision 
to move in the direction outlined by the Tenth Plan and Vision 2030 is a testament to their 
commitment to providing the best economic opportunity for its people. While policies like these 
are naturally written with an optimistic tone, the consistency with which the House of Saud has 
completed goals outlined by previous plans leaves no indication that these are only words on a 
page. Because similar policies led to prosperity in the past, the House of Saud will likely 
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continue to use and implement objectives involving economic diversification, infrastructure 
development, and social welfare long into the future. 
Political Stability through Unity 
 While the House of Saud continues to strive for political stability, their hold on the throne 
is perhaps the firmest since the unification of the Kingdom a century ago. The last fifty years of 
rule was marred by struggle against competing religious groups and inter-house competition for 
the throne. Today’s Royal Family, however, does not experience the same issues as their 
forefathers, and instead focuses on contributing to society internally, while demonstrating power 
externally.  
Domestically, the House of Saud provides support for its people through their 
development plans and initiatives like Vision 2030. Since family members traditionally hold 
positions at the head of each ministry, the Saudi Royal Family is able to take credit for each of 
the country’s successes. While this provides a weak spot for competing groups to attack in times 
of crisis, it affirms their consolidation of power in times of success. Since 2010, the House of 
Saud enjoyed affirmation, and continued the consolidation of power that began at the turn of the 
century. It appears that their strategy for maintaining their stability atop the Saudi social structure 
is accomplished through the promotion of social unity through the advancement of the 
individual. Evidenced by the social goals in the Ninth and Tenth Plans, the Saudi government is 
satisfying the public through increasing the standard of living for their citizens. In doing so, it 
seems likely that they will meet the rising expectations of their growing population. In 2011, the 
Ministry of Economy and Planning (MEP) reported that all twenty-one of their general social 
goals were either completed or on pace to be completed by 2015. To eliminate criticisms 
regarding bias in the report, the MEP provided verification of the comprehensiveness of the data 
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collection and statistical analysis at the beginning of the report. Goals included ensuring all 
children had access to primary education, universal access to reproductive health, and cutting the 
number of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water in half284. As a result of 
meeting these goals, the Saudi public lives as comfortably as any point in the history of the 
Kingdom. 
 On the world stage, Saudi Arabia has made it clear that they are prosperous, powerful, 
and driven by self-interest. Since 2010, they bolstered their domestic military as a means of 
decreasing reliance on foreign protection, in part to avoid an ethical and social dilemma 
reminiscent of the Persian Gulf War285. Similarly, they respected the wishes of the international 
community in emphasizing environmental protection in their recent development plans, but only 
under conditions which were convenient to them. While concerns for the environment were 
expressed at the international level as early as the 1990s, Saudi Arabia did not add a renewable 
energy program into their infrastructural development plan until the opening of the KAUST in 
2009 and the King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy in 2010286287. At this time, 
the public in Saudi Arabia was willing to accept change about which they might have been 
apprehensive a decade earlier. Cultural changes surrounding the role of women, traditional jobs, 
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and religion in education opened the minds of the Saudi public toward new ideas. One idea that 
was particularly susceptible to change in this period concerned oil and its use in the community. 
Although international pressure existed for decades beforehand, the Saudi government finally 
committed to implementing large-scale renewable technology with the Ninth Plan in 2010. 
The Role of Culture in Enriching the Renewable Narrative 
 Without a change in the culture surrounding oil reliance, the implementation of 
renewable energy infrastructure would have been even further delayed in Saudi Arabia. As the 
last chapter mentioned, changing norms regarding women in the workplace, acceptable jobs for 
males, and promoting a science-based education while curbing the fanaticism promoted by the 
neo-Wahhabi regime led to an openness among the Saudi public toward new ideas. Recognizing 
this alongside the successes that the diversification of the economy brought in the 21st century, 
the Saudi government seized the opportunity to establish renewable testing centers and research 
universities. Today, those centers are informing policy decisions at the federal level: by 2023, the 
government aims to have ten percent of its energy produced by renewables288. Specifically, 
feasibility studies have returned promising findings for the implementation of nuclear, wind, 
solar, thermal, and solid waste energy systems on the national grid289. Behind this US $30-50 
billion investment is the blessing of Allah290291. As was demonstrated in previous chapters that 
the public believed that Allah bestowed them with the right to use their oil, the same is becoming 
true for the other natural resources in the Kingdom. Crown Prince bin Salman’s foreword to 
Vision 2030 explains this by beginning with affirming the national commitment to preserve the 
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Holy Land, and later describing their wealth of diverse natural resources292. In this way, the 
House of Saud led the way for renewable implementation by interpreting the transition to 
renewable energy through the same lens with which it viewed oil as a fuel for electricity since 
1960. This interpretation, paired with the newfound openness of the Saudi public to change that 
has existed since the turn of the century, added to the strength of the renewable narrative in Saudi 
Arabia. Support from the public is essential to the success of any major governmental project, 
even in a monarchy, and the House of Saud holds that support today.  
Summary 
In sum, prospects for the implementation of a large-scale renewable energy infrastructure 
in Saudi Arabia today are significantly greater than they were half a century ago. While the 
country was bogged down in concerns regarding political stability, the ineffectiveness of state-
sponsored environmental authorities, and a cultural narrative of oil reliance, the case in all three 
aspects is much different today. As it stands, Saudi Arabia is currently implementing more 
comprehensive environmental policies than ever and sticking to them by making public 
commitments through development plans and initiatives like Vision 2030. The promotion of 
renewable energy is being reinforced by a period of increased stability currently being enjoyed 
by the House of Saud as a result of their success in meeting the rising expectations of the public. 
Because they have a stable rule, the House of Saud was able to influence public opinion by 
framing the use of natural resources like sunlight, wind, and water in energy production as a 
usage of Allah’s gift to their country, much like they did with oil in the fifty years prior. All in 
all, these three key factors continue to impact one another, and influence the economic, social, 
and political success of Saudi Arabia as a whole. This presents exciting prospects for the future, 
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as they are now serving to magnify the benefits of renewable policy, rather than maintain the 
widespread, unsustainable use of oil in domestic energy production.  
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